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ABSTRACT 
This paper explores the nexus between earnings management and religiosity. It complements 
prior research on the impact of religious social norms of the firm’s environment on earnings 
management practices. Using a sample of 11,105 U.S. firm-year observations between 2004 
and 2013, we find that religiosity is negatively associated with the accruals-based method, 
but positively related to both real-activities and classification shifting. This suggests that 
religiosity could serve as a correction mechanism to accruals earnings management practices. 
However, managers in highly religious areas consider real- activities and classification 
shifting as ethically and morally appropriate. In addition, we interact religiosity measures 
with governance variables to provide evidence of the importance of religion in relation to 
board characteristics. As part of robustness analysis we examine the impact of religion in 
high and low religious areas, as well as in urban and rural areas. Our findings remain robust 
and argue in favour of the importance of religious social norms in earnings management.  
 
Keywords: Religiosity, Religious Social Norms, Earnings Management, Classification 
Shifting, and Corporate Governance. 
 
JEL Classification: M41, M14, Z12  
 
 
 
 
*Department of Business and Management, University of Sussex, Jubilee Building, Brighton, BN1 9SL, UK, e-mail: 
e.boahen@sussex.ac.uk. **Department of Management and Economics, University of Sussex, Jubilee Building, Brighton, 
BN1 9SL, UK, e-mail: e.mamatzakis@sussex.ac.uk. 
Corresponding author: e.boahen@sussex.ac.uk (E. Boahen),   
 Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2668910 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 2 
 
1. INTRODUCTION  
Research on earnings management has been rather prolific (Zalata and Roberts, 2015; Kim 
and Park, 2014; Donelson, Mcinnis & Mergenthaler, 2013; Gao, 2013; Gerakos and 
Kovrijnykh, 2013, Wongsunwai, 2013, Boone, Khurana & Raman, 2012; McGuire, Omer & 
Sharp, 2012; Zang, 2012; Haw, Ho and Li, 2011), yet when it comes to studying the impact 
of religious social norm of the firms' environment no silver bullets have been offered 
(Dyreng, Mayew and Williams, 2010; Grullon, Kanatas, Weston, 2010). This paper provides 
a missing link in the literature as it provides a plethora of empirical evidence of the 
importance of religion for earnings management, whilst it sheds, for the first time, light of the 
impact of the former on classification shifting.
1
 Indeed, as religious social norms could 
influence the behaviour of managers (Dyreng et al., 2010; Grullon et al. 2010), it is 
reasonable to examine the impact of religious social norms on earnings management in a 
broader sense in order to help regulators, contract designers, accounting professionals, and 
even investors.  
 
The existing few studies that have sought to establish an association between religious social 
norms of the firms' environment and earnings management practices have concentrated on 
accrual-based or real-activities based earnings management (McGuire et al. 2012, Callen, 
Morel and Richardson, 2011; Dyreng et al. 2010; Dechow, Sloan and Sweeney, 1996). 
However, none of these studies considered misclassification of core expenses into special 
items. Clearly, the effect of religion on classification shifting remains unexplored whilst 
findings from existing studies on the relationship between religiosity and earnings 
management are inadequate (McGuire et al., 2012; Hilary and Hui, 2009). As indicated by 
Sunder (2005), an understanding of religious social norms has tremendous effect on the 
shaping of appropriate financial standards and Levitt (1998) suggests that norms attrition 
underpins financial statement manipulation. 
On another strand of the literature (Terpstra, Rozell and Robinson, 1993; Barnett, Jermier and 
Lafferty, 1996; Weaver and Agle, 2002; Conroy and Emerson, 2004; Longenecker, 
                                                          
1
Classification shifting defines the deliberately misclassifying cost of goods sold, and the recording of 
general and administrative expenses as special items. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 3 
McKinney and Moore, 2004) provides evidence of the impact of religiosity on business 
ethics. For example, Weaver and Agle (2002) observe that business ethics is positively 
related to religiosity especially when religion is an important part of individual’s self-identity. 
Again, prior research indicates that highly religious individuals tend to hold conservative 
views and high moral standards than individuals with lower religious background (Terpstra et 
al. 1993; Barnett et al., 1996). Following these studies, Conroy and Emerson (2004) examine 
the association between religiosity and financial reporting and find that religiosity is 
negatively related to the use of accounting manipulation. Kennedy and Lawton (1998) 
observe that the higher the degree of religious social norms in an environment, the stronger 
its effect on people who live and operate in that environment. Similarly, Welch, Tittle and 
Petee (1991) note that the prominence attached to religious social norms in an environment 
has a great impact on individual’s devotion to social norms, attitudes and beliefs. Thus 
managers’ behaviour are shaped by the religious social norms of the population in the 
neighbourhood that surrounds them.  
In addition, prior studies (Zalata and Roberts, 2015; Gonzalez and Garcia-Meca, 2014; Kim, 
Mauldin and Patro, 2014; Haw, Ho and Li, 2011; Lin and Hwang, 2010; Harris and Raviv, 
2008) indicate that strong corporate governance acts as a form of monitoring mechanism, 
controls devious managerial behaviour and reduces information risk. Similarly, other studies 
also document that strong boards and audit committees mitigate earnings management 
practices. For example, (Xie, Davidson and DaDalt, 2003; Peasnell, Pope and Young, 2005) 
observe a negative association between board tenure, proportion of independent directors and 
accrual-based earnings management. Again, (Hossain, Mitra, Rezaee and Sarath, 2011) 
observe that the relationship between board size, number of meetings and accrual-based 
earnings management is negative. Also, audit committees (Abbott, Parker, Peters and 
Raghunandan, 2003), number of meetings and financial expertise (Coles, Daniel and Naveen, 
2008), CEO tenure (Cadman and Sunder, 2014), number of outside directors (Chau and Gray, 
2010) and CEO reputation (Francis, Huang, Rajgopal and Zang, 2008) have been found to 
affect earning management. 
The objective of this paper is to complement and to comprehensively extend previous 
evidence of the impact of religious social norms on earnings management practices. In 
particular, we examine the association between religious social norms and accruals-based, 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 4 
real-activities based as well as on classification shifting earnings management in U.S. We 
also interact religiosity with corporate governance variables to assess the impact of religiosity 
and corporate governance on earnings management. We respond to the call by Callen et al., 
(2011) and McGuire et al., (2012) to examine the extent to which religion affects earnings 
management on a broader scale by exploring the association between religiosity and 
misclassification of expenses.  Again, we focus on all U.S. states to establish the relationship 
between religiosity earnings management using all U.S. county level religious dataset from 
The Association of Religious Data Archives (ARDA) database and all US firms in the 
Compustat database. Overall, we identify 790 distinctive counties that are the headquarters of 
at least one of the firms on the Compustat annual database used in our analyses. We collect 
financial data from all firms on the Compustat database between 2004 and 2013.  
From the analyses, we observe a significant association between religious social norms and 
the proxies for real- activities and classification shifting earnings management. On the other 
hand, in line with prior research (McGuire et al 2012; Callen et al, 2011) we find that 
religiosity is significantly related to the accrual-based earnings management. The results 
suggest that managers in a highly religious environment shun excessive forms of accrual-
based earnings management despite the pressure to meet earnings targets but they are 
engaged in real-activities and misclassify core expenses into special items where there is 
limited or no external monitoring to meet capital market pressures. We conduct several 
analyses to examine the association between religiosity and our proxies for earnings 
management to support our results but our inferences remain the same.  
In further analyses, we study the interaction between religiosity and corporate governance. 
Results show that religious social norms are significantly positively related to 
misclassification of expenses and real activities but negatively associated with accrual based 
earnings management when good corporate governance is observed. In such environments, 
religiosity serves as a form of monitoring for accrual based earnings management.  
The paper makes three important contributions. First, we examine whether religiosity is 
associated with classification shifting, accruals-based and real-activities based earnings 
management. Second, we investigate whether firms in highly religious environment with 
good corporate governance affect managers from using real-activities and misclassification of 
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core expenses into special items to meet earnings targets as a result of market pressures. 
Third, we show that for different measures and models, that take into account also corporate 
governance, religiosity is associated with accruals-based, real-activities-based and 
classification shifting earnings management respectively. In addition, the paper shows that 
religiosity impacts both firms in rural and urban areas, and that managers in religious 
environment favour classification shifting and real activities-based earnings management.  
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. In section 2, we discuss the literature and 
develop the hypotheses. Section 3 covers research design, empirical methodology and 
estimation equations. Section 4 discusses data collection, sampling and descriptive statistics. 
The regression results are discussed in section 5. In addition, section 6 presents results of 
robustness tests and further sensitivity analyses. Section 7 provides conclusion and future 
research. 
2. HYPOTHESES DEVELOPMENT 
 
2.1 Accrual-Based Earnings Management and Religious Social Norm 
 
From the view point of social norm theory, managers of firms operating in religious 
environment with diverse social norms exhibit varied behaviours (Tayler and Bloomfield, 
2010). In fact, individuals’ decisions are shaped by the moral values and social norms of the 
environment where they live or work. The resilience of religious social norms has posed great 
surprises in recent decades (Renneboog and Spaenjers, 2011; Hilary and Hui, 2009). For 
instance, prior research has established the relationship between religion and personal 
behaviour (Lehrer, 2004, p. 180), religion and development (Mersland, D’Espallier and 
Supphellen, 2012; Ter Haar & Ellis, 2006), religion, economic attitudes and household 
income (Renneboog and Spaenjers, 2012). Indeed, establishing the link between individuals’ 
religious values and economic development has been extensively covered in the economics 
literature but the link between religion and earnings management is scanty in the accounting 
literature (McGuire et al. (2012). Indeed, religious social norms are deemed to have influence 
on the behaviour of managers, it is therefore, reasonable to examine the impact of these 
religious norms on earnings management in order to help regulators, contract designers, 
accounting professionals, and even investors (Dyreng et al. 2010; Grullon et al. 2010). 
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Accruals-based earnings management amount to generally accepted accounting principles 
(GAAP) violation, subject to external monitoring and auditors’ scrutiny. Therefore, Bruns 
and Merchant (1990), indicate that accrual-based earnings management is fraudulent on 
ethical grounds. Again, Graham et al. (2005) note that it is risky and costly to depend on 
accruals earnings management because of the close scrutiny of external monitors and 
auditors. Despite the expectation to meet earnings targets and capital market pressures, prior 
research (McGuire et al., 2012; Callen et al, 2011; Dyreng et al., 2010; Hilary and Hui, 2009) 
observe that there is a negative relationship between the risk appetite levels of individuals and 
their religiosity. Again, Dyreng et al. (2010) and Grullon et al. (2010), report that firms in a 
highly religious environment report lower financial reporting irregularities.  Similarly, 
McGuire et al. (2012) corroborated existing findings and indicate that firms headquartered in 
highly religious areas have lower accounting risk and misreporting associated with 
accounting restatements. Therefore, it could be that managers whose firms’ are headquartered 
in a highly religious social norms environment will be less likely to be involved in accruals-
based earnings management. Following the above arguments and the perception that accrual-
based earnings management is manipulative and unethical, the hypothesis that follows is that: 
H1: Is accrual-based earnings management related to the religiosity of the firm’s 
environment?  
 
2.2 Real-activities Earnings Management and Religious Social Norm 
 
Thus, previous researchers have indicated that religion affects individuals’ behaviour and that 
religiosity enhances individual’s ethical values and attitudes (Tayler and Bloomfield, 2010; 
Vitell, 2009; Parboteeah, Hoegl and Cullen, 2008). This view is also corroborated by Shu, 
Sulaeman and Yeung (2012) who find that individual’s level of religiosity is positively 
correlated with high ethical values. According to Lehrer (2004), the personal religious values 
such as: discipline (Kennedy and Lawton, 1998), accountable (Iannaccone, 1998), honest 
(Keister, 2003) has the potential to influence the performance of firms and for that matter the 
characteristics of individuals. In a related study, Barro and McCleary (2003) assess the 
impact of religiosity on performance and observe that managers can maintain high levels of 
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success and performance irrespective of the demographic and cultural background in which 
the moral values are implemented. Sunder (2005) underscores the importance of religious 
values to the stakeholders of the firm and find that the absence of religiosity can potentially 
harm stakeholders and affect the whole system and performance of the organisation (Omer, 
Sharp and Wang, 2010). In relation to earnings management, Merchant (1990) and Graham et 
al. (2005) observe that managers prefer real-activities to accruals-based earnings management 
because over reliance on accruals is costly, risky and subject to the scrutiny of auditors and 
regulators.  Again, Gunny (2010) find that real activities earnings management influences the 
performance of the firm but Horton, Serafeim and Serafeim (2013) indicate that financial 
reporting process and quality can be distorted. 
 
Conceptually, managers with strong religious values would be less inclined to engage in 
earnings management practices because of their strong morals, values, beliefs and attitudes. 
However, McGuire et al. (2012) observe that religious adherence does not exclude 
individuals from engaging in dishonest practices but Hillary and Hui (2009) find that firms 
headquartered in a highly religious social norms environment exhibits conventional corporate 
investing behaviour. Surprisingly, Callen et al., (2011) observe in a cross-country study that 
religion does not mitigate earnings management practices. A positive association between 
religious social norms of the firm’s environment and real-activities based earnings 
management could exist because the latter does not involve GAAP violation, not subject to 
external monitoring and scrutiny of auditors. Therefore, it could be that religious managers 
would be involved in real-activities earnings management because there is no external 
monitoring or auditor vigilance on real- activities. Following the above and the desire to meet 
earnings targets due to capital market pressures, we posit that managers working in a highly 
religious social norms environment would be inclined to engage in real-activities earnings 
management to boost reported earnings. The following hypothesis is therefore presented to be 
tested:   
H2: Is real-activities earnings management associated with the religiosity of the firm’s 
environment? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 8 
 
 
2.3 Classification Shifting Earnings Management and Religious Social Norm 
 
In fact, previous studies to establish the association between religion and earnings 
management (McGuire et al., 2012; Callen et al., 2011; Dyreng et al, 2009) have ignored 
classification shifting as an earnings management method. Classification shifting re-arranges 
income statement items and does not change the bottom-line reported earnings and it 
involves; classifying operating expenses as discontinued operations (Barua et al., 2010), 
classifying operating expenses as extraordinary items (Ronen and Sadan, 1975; Barnea, 
1976) and classifying operating expenses as special items (Fan et al., 2010; McVay, 2006). 
We investigate this gap in the earnings management literature.
2
 Zalata and Robert, (2015); 
Fan et al., (2010) and McVay, (2006) indicate that whilst the various methods of earnings 
management raise expectations of future performance, both real-activities and accrual-based 
earnings management have the effect of reducing future or past earnings. Consequently, the 
reputation and the quality of the company is compromised (Cao, Myers and Omer, 2012).   
With classification shifting, McVay (2006) indicates that there is no change in reported 
earnings; rather core earnings are inflated as recurring items are shifted to non-recurring and 
exceptional items leading to a positive relationship between core earnings and special items 
(Behn, Gotti, Hermann and Kang, 2013). There is no implication for future reported earnings 
(Barua et al., 2010), therefore, external regulators pay less attention to classification shifting 
but subject other forms of earnings management to more scrutiny because of their potential 
effect to increase reported net income (Nelson et al., 2002). On ethical grounds, these studies 
(McGuire et al., 2012; Dryeng et al., 2010; Grullen et al., 2010) indicate that religiosity 
influences earnings management and curbs financial reporting irregularities (Hui, 2009). For 
example, Callen et al., (2011) find no relationship between religious social norms of the 
firms’ environment and earnings management. However, McGuire et al., (2012) and Dyreng 
et al., (2010) report a negative association between religiosity and accrual-based earnings 
management but positive relationship between real-activities based earnings management and 
                                                          
2 Classification shifting does not involve GAAP violation; auditors and regulators do not scrutinize classification shifting as they do for 
accrual-based and real-activities earnings management (Fan et al., 2010; McVay, 2006). 
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religiosity. Scott (1995) argues that earnings management can be beneficial by signalling 
managers’ inside information to investors. From the discussions above, we posit that 
managers in areas with strong religious backgrounds would see classification shifting as an 
avenue to signal managers inside information, good business practice and best approach for 
increasing the bottom line profit because of lack of external monitors. The above arguments 
therefore lead to the following hypothesis:  
H3: Is there a relationship between classification shifting earnings management and the 
religiosity of the firm’s environment? 
 
3 DATA AND DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS 
3.1 Measuring Religiosity  
We utilise religious dataset published by Religious Congregations and Membership Study 
(RCMS) between 1990 and 2010 to measure the strength of religious social norms. We use 
these datasets to create our proxy for religiosity. The religiosity dataset is derived from 
Association of Statisticians of American Religious Bodies (ASARB). The results of these 
surveys are published on the website of Association of Religion Data Archive (ARDA). The 
survey consists of an average of 173 religious bodies
3
 and a total of 248,957 congregations 
with an average of 150,686,156 adherents. This represents 51.9% of the average U.S. 
population during the period between 1990 and 2010. The average percentage of population 
showing religiosity and religious adherents from each U.S. County is 64.4% and respondents 
exceeded 55.9% of the total population from each U.S. County. Religious adherents consist 
of all members, full members, communicants or non- communicants, baptized or non-
baptized, regular attendants, participants of weekly religious activities and those who 
consider religion as important part of their life.  
 
Following prior studies (Dyreng et al., 2010; Grullon et al., 2009; Hilary and Hui, 2009) total 
religious adherents in each county for a period. The data are then scaled by the total county 
                                                          
3
 Of this, there were on average 154 Christian denominations and associations (including Messianic Jews, Latter-Day Saints, and 
Universalist groups); there were also counts of Shinto, Sikh, Jain, National Spiritualist Association Congregations, and several 
congregations and adherents from three Buddhist groupings, four Hindu groupings, Baha’s, four Jewish groupings, Zoroastrians and 
Muslims. 
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population as reported by US Census Bureau of that same period. Conceptually, the higher 
the percentage of religious adherents in a county, the higher the impact of religious social 
norm on the firms headquartered in that county. Therefore, we use total number of religious 
adherents per capita in line with prior studies (Grullon et al., 2009; Hout and Greely, 1998).  
Overall, we identify 790 distinctive counties that are the headquarters of at least one of the 
firms on the Compustat annual database used in our analyses between 2004 and 2013. The 
county-level religiosity scores are matched to their respective U.S. States by merging them by 
year using the state code identifiers from the Compustat’s company location code where 
firms are headquartered to derive the State-level religious dataset. We use religious dataset 
covering all U.S. States. The data requirement for each dependent and independent variable is 
a function of the number of observations and test required for the analysis.  
 
Table 1 below provides descriptive statistics for the measure of RELIGIOSITY (REL). Table 
1 shows that religiosity in the U.S. is declining from an average of approximately 60% in 
1990 to an average of 48% in 2010 in each county. This is consistent with the 2008 American 
Religious Identification Survey, which reports a substantial decline in religiosity among US 
population between 1990 and 2008. In addition, Table 1 indicates that approximately 54% of 
all people in each US are affiliated with a religion, attend a religious activity or considers 
religion as important in their life. 
 
TABLE 1: Descriptive Statistics for Religiosity  
Variable  Mean Std. Dev. Q1 Median Q3 Skewness kurtosis 
REL 53.5 18.07 36.27 52.47 63.33 0.83 2.69 
RELAdh – 1990 59.5 20 44.8 59.5 73 0.87 2.4 
RELAdh – 2000 53 18.6 39.4 51.1 64.7 0.74 2.98 
RELAdh – 2010 48 15.6 24.6 46.8 52.3 0.88 2.68 
Notes: Religiosity (REL) = is the variable of interest, measured as the average of US counties religiosity score weighted by 
the county’s population for the period, 1990 2000 and 2010. RELAdh = a measure of religious adherence for US counties in 
1990, 2000 and 2010. Association of Statisticians of American Religious Bodies (ASARB) collects religiosity dataset, which 
are published by the Association of Religion Data Archive (ARDA). 
 
In the robustness tests, we use Gallup religious database for the twenty most and least 
religious US States for the same study period. Based on the responses collected by Gallup, on 
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whether religion is important, respondents attend religious activities weekly or are affiliated 
with religion, Mississippi came out, as the most religious state, whilst Vermont is the least 
religious state. The most religious states are mainly in the South, with the exception of Utah, 
while the least religious states are concentrated in New England and the West.    
Table 2: Comparison of Most and Least Religious States in the US 
Ten Most  
Religious States in US 
Ranking 
Top States 
Ten Least 
 Religious States in US 
Ranking 
Bottom States 
Mississippi 1 Vermont 1 
Utah 2 New Hampshire 2 
Alabama 3 Maine 3 
Louisiana 4 Massachusetts 4 
South Carolina 5 Oregon 5 
Tennessee 6 Nevada 6 
Georgia 7 Washington 7 
Arkansas 8 Connecticut 8 
North Carolina 9 Hawaii 9 
Oklahoma 10 District of Columbia 10 
Notes: Table 2 shows comparison of most and least religious states in the US compiled by Gallup. Since 1965, Gallup has 
conducted interviews about US adults religiosity. The results over the years suggest that religious attitudes are very stable, 
consistent with ASARB studies. The percentage of US adults who consider religion to be important according to Gallup are 
as follows: 1990 = 58 percent; 2000 = 58 percent; 2005 = 55 percent; 2006 = 56 percent; 2007 = 56 percent; 2008 = 54 
percent; 2009 = 56 percent; 2010 = 56 percent. 
 
 
3.2 Control Variables  
 
In addition to the variable of interest, we include additional firm-level and county-level 
demographic control variables that prior research indicates are the determinants of earnings 
management. In particular, we control for the presence of BIG4 auditors
4
 (Barton, 2005), 
analyst following (Brochet, Miller and Srinivasan, 2013), profitability, audit tenure and 
growth opportunities because these factors impact on the choice of earnings management 
methods (McGuire et al. 2012; Cohen and Zarowin, 2010). For example, Becker et al. (1998) 
observe that there is a negative association between audit quality and earnings management. 
In addition, we control for firms located in rural areas because prior research (Walker, 2013; 
Urcan, 2007) observe that higher earnings quality is associated with firms located in rural 
areas. Again, using percentage change in gross domestic product as a proxy for changes in 
economic activities, we control for differences in economic activities between years as 
                                                          
4 BIG4 auditors include - PricewaterHousecoopers (PwC), KPMG, Deloitte & Touché, and Ernst & Young. 
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changes in economic conditions could impact on real activities of firms (McGuire et al. 2012; 
Cohen and Zarowin, 2010; Cohen et al. 2008). Given that there is a costs associated with 
earnings management, we include net operating assets of each firm to control for earnings 
management. Also, we control for return on assets because firm performance influences the 
choice of earnings management method (Cohen et al. 2008; Kothari et al. 2005). The poorer 
the performance of the firm, the keener will be the tendency to engage in earnings 
management by firms. Thus, we anticipate a negative coefficient on return on assets. Also, 
we include firm size to control for the existing variations in accruals behaviour between large 
and small firms (Gul, Fung and Jaggi, 2009).  
Prior studies (Ashbaugh, Lafond, and Mayhew, 2003) indicate that small firms are more 
likely to engage in earnings management than large firms. Therefore, depending on the size 
of the firms in the sample, we expect a negative or positive association between earnings 
management and firm size. To secure external financing, prior studies (Chung and Kallupur, 
2003; Johnson and Nelson 2002) indicate that management might manage reported earnings 
upwards. Therefore, we control for leverage, estimated as the ratio of long-term debt to total 
assets because prior studies indicate that managing earnings upwards allows firms to meet 
debts covenants (Zang, 2012; Badertscher, 2011; Yu, 2008; Sweeney, 1994). In addition, 
DeFond and Jiambalvo (1994) report that firms with a higher debt (leverage) have the 
tendency to manage earnings because of debts covenants, therefore a positive relationship 
between leverage and earnings management is expected. Furthermore, we control for firms 
reporting operational loss in the previous year because Francis and Yu (2009) observe that 
there is a positive relationship between earnings management and prior year losses but a 
negative relationship between firms reporting profits in the previous year and earnings 
management. However, the sign of operating loss can be negative or positive depending on 
whether earnings management is income decreasing or increasing.      
To assess the extent of misclassification of core expenses, we include lagged core earnings 
(     ) because of the unrelenting nature of core earnings. Again, asset turnover ratio (    ) 
is added to the model because Nassim and Penman (2001) report that there exists a negative 
relationship between profit margin and     . In addition, McVay (2006) indicates that 
inclusion of      in the model (6) above is crucial because changes to the operating 
strategies are associated with firms that have large income-decreasing special items, for 
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example, firms can change their profit and sales mix to affect the level of core earnings. We 
include            , which are prior year operating accruals and           which are 
current year accruals in the model. Previous studies (Fan et al., 2010; McVay, 2006; Sloan, 
1996) observe that earnings performance of firms is influenced by accruals and cash flows 
earnings components. These studies observe that accruals manipulation could result in high 
or low accruals figure, which can affect firm’s performance. Therefore, we include accruals 
to ensure a good prediction of core earnings. Again, prior research (McVay, 2006; Anderson, 
Banker and Janakiraman, 2003) indicates that costs increase is associated with changes in 
activity level. We therefore include change in sales (       ) and the percentage change in 
sales (           ), if         is less than 0, otherwise zero. 
 
3.3 Data Collection 
We collect financial data from all firms on the compustat database between 2004 and 2013. 
In line with prior research, data from specialised industries such as banks and insurances 
companies as well as other financial services were excluded from the datasets (Donelson et 
al., 2013; McGuire et al. 2012; Zang, 2012). Financial services companies with (Standard 
Industry Classification code (SIC) 60-69) are deleted as prior studies (eg. Francis and Yu, 
2009; Maijoor and Vanstraelen, 2006) indicate that their accruals generating process differ 
significantly and they require specific accounting rules and requirements, including, the 
minimum capital requirements and specific regulations governing financial services 
companies. Again, firms with missing data and those with less than eight firm-year 
observations to estimate earnings management are excluded (Cohen and Zarowin, 2010; 
Francis and Yu, 2009). In addition, to shun bias resulting from the inclusion of insignificant 
firms in the sample, the paper excludes any observation with revenue less than $500,000 
(Ball and Shivakumar, 2008), thus reducing the number of firms and firm-year observations 
with all necessary variables to 1,616 and 11,105 respectively. The final sample is used to 
estimate discretionary accruals and other earnings management measures
5
. We obtain 
additional data from other sources including, Annual Reports, Audit Analytics, CRSP and 
I/B/E/S.  
                                                          
5 Appendices  B and C provide the detailed breakdown of the sampling procedure and firms’ classification by year and industry. 
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Table 3 below presents descriptive statistics for all dependent variables 
(ABNOR_ACCRUALS, REALMGMT1, REALMGMT2, and ABNOR_CORE) which are 
proxies for earnings management methods. Consistent with prior studies (McGuire et al., 
2012; Omer et al., 2010) the univariate statistics appear similar to other distributions for all 
dependent variables, which are winsorized at the first and 99
th
 percentile.  
Table 3: Descriptive Statistics for Accounting Data 
 
Mean 
Std. 
Dev. 
Q1 Median Q3 skewness kurtosis 
Dependent Variables 
       
ABNOR_ACCRUALS -0.01 0.98 -0.05 -0.04 0.24 -0.62 2.62 
REALMGMT1 -0.02 0.39 -0.16 -0.03 0.21 -0.17 1.52 
REALMGMT2 -0.01 0.24 -0.11 -0.02 0.14 -0.16 1.52 
ABNOR_CORE -0.01 0.69 -0.03 -0.01 0.03 -0.15 1.5 
Demographic Control 
Variables        
POPN 2.61 0.08 2.52 2.6 2.68 -0.5 1.5 
INCOME 10.86 0.09 10.84 10.88 10.93 -1.02 2.53 
EDUC 85.98 2.71 83.9 87.2 87.67 -1.08 2.87 
AGE 40.44 1.83 40.02 40.35 41.89 -0.84 2.94 
MINORITY 30.58 12.42 19.69 25.83 38.47 0.95 2.71 
POLITICAL 41.61 3.14 39 41 43 0.09 2.87 
Firm-Level Control 
Variables         
SIZE 5.68 1.76 3.39 5.19 6.88 0.86 2.83 
ANALYST_FOL 2.91 1.4 2 3 4 0.28 2.03 
ROA -0.31 0.14 -0.03 0.04 0.08 -1.59 2.77 
LEV 0.15 0.16 0 0.1 0.25 0.89 2.67 
BIG4 0.69 0.31 1 1 1 -2.49 3.19 
MBV 2.01 1.21 1.02 1.75 2.91 0.49 1.98 
LOSS 0.48 0.5 0 0 1 0.06 1 
OP_RISK 0.65 16.35 0.23 0.5 0.86 0.91 2.79 
RURAL 2.9 0.12 2.82 2.88 2.98 0.72 2.91 
BENCHMARK 0.04 0.11 -0.04 0.04 0.08 -1.11 3.15 
TENURE 1.31 0.57 1.1 1.39 1.79 -0.72 3.06 
CHANGE_GDP 1.89 1.65 0.8 1.7 2.7 0.89 3.29 
INVESTMENT 0.08 0.06 0.04 0.07 0.11 0.94 3.01 
NOA 0.78 1.26 0.39 0.49 0.88 -0.16 1.57 
Notes: Descriptive statistics for demographic control variables in Table 3 are based on our sample of 790 U.S. Counties and 
the firm-level control variables are based on our sample of 11,105 firm-year observations. Continuous variables are 
winsorized at 1st and 99th percentile.  All variables are defined below and in the Appendix A. Variables Definitions: 
ABNOR_ACCRUALS = measure of abnormal accruals using the Modified-Jones model in equation 1 below. REALMGMT1 
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= calculated as the aggregate of abnormal discretionary expenditures (ABNOR_DEX6P) and abnormal production costs 
(ABNOR_PCOST)7. REALMGMT2 = calculated as the aggregate of abnormal discretionary expenditure (ABNOR_DEXP) 
and abnormal cash flows (ABNOR_CASH)8. The higher the value for REALMGMT1 and REALMGMT2, the higher the 
level of real earnings management. ABNOR_CORE or UNEXP_CE = computed as the difference between reported core 
earnings (REP_CE)9 and expected core earnings (NOR_CE)10 for each firm. POPN = natural log of the estimate of the 
population for each US State in millions. INCOME = household income for each US State in ten thousands ($) estimated by 
Census Bureau. EDUC = measure of the adult population in each US State with college education, estimated by Gallup 
interviews. AGE = average age of residents in each US State, based on the responses from Gallup interviews. MINORITY = 
percentage of racial minorities in each US State, from responses to the Gallup interviews. POLITICAL = percentage of the 
adult population in each US State who is affiliated with the Republican Party, from Gallup interview response. SIZE= 
natural log of total assets scaled by consumer price index; ANALYST_FOL = number of financial analysts following the firm 
in the I/B/E/S summary file; ROA = return on assets, measured as net income before extraordinary items divided by average 
total assets; LEV = financial leverage, measured as total debts scaled by total equity; BIG4 = a value of 1 if the firm was 
audited by BIG4 audit firm for a firm year observation, otherwise zero; MBV = measured as total assets divided by market 
capitalization; LOSS = indicator variable that equals 1 if income before extraordinary items was negative in the current or 
previous two fiscal years, and 0 otherwise; OP_RISK = estimated as five year rolling standard deviation of operating cash 
flows estimated from both current and previous four years; RURAL = Indicator variable that equals 1 if the firm is 
headquartered outside the 490 largest counties in the sample, and 0 otherwise; BENCHMARK = an indicator value is if (a) 
net income scaled by total assets is more than or equal to 0 and less than 0.01. Alternatively, if the change in net income 
scaled by total assets from previous year to current year is greater than or equal to 0 and less than 0.01, and 0 otherwise; 
TENURE = natural log of the number of years the auditor has been with the firm; CHANGE_GDP = annual percentage 
change in GDP; INVESTMENT = percentage of capital expenditure at the beginning of the year (t) to total net property, plant 
and equipment at the end of the year (t); NOA = sum of shareholders’ equity less cash and marketable securities plus total 
debt at the beginning of the year, scaled by total assets at the beginning of the year.  
 
Table 3 also presents descriptive statistics for the county-level demographic control variables 
(POPN, INCOME, EDUC, AGE, MINORITY, POLITICAL). The average age is 
approximately 40 and 86% of the population have a minimum of college education. Also, 
approximately 42% of the population are affiliated with Republican Political Party and an 
average minority population is roughly 31%.  To control for skewness and kurtosis in income 
and population variables in line with previous studies (McGuire et al., 2012; Omer et al., 
2010), the natural log of each county’s income and population was taken. The original data 
shows that on average, each county has 3.9 million people and the average household income 
is $91,700 per year. Again, Table 3 presents univariate statistics for firm-level control 
variables (SIZE, ANALYST_FOL, ROA, LEV, BIG4, MBV, LOSS, OP_RISK, RURAL, 
                                                          
6
 ABNOR_DEXP - estimated by regressing discretionary expenses on the inverse of lagged total assets and lagged sales scaled by lagged 
total assets. The figure for (ABNOR_DEXP) is multiplied by negative one (-1), consequently, a higher (ABNOR_DEXP) figure represents 
higher real earnings management. 
7 ABNOR_PCOST - estimated by regressing PCOST on the inverse of lagged total assets, sales scaled by lagged total assets, change in sales 
scaled by lagged total assets. The figure for (ABNOR_PCOST) is multiplied by negative one (-1), consequently, a higher (ABNOR_PCOST) 
figure represents higher real earnings management. 
8 ABNOR_CASH- estimated by regressing CASFO scaled by lagged total assets on the inverse of lagged total assets, sales scaled by lagged 
total assets, change in sales scaled by lagged total assets. The figure for (ABNOR_ CASH) is multiplied by negative one (-1), consequently, 
a higher (ABNOR_ CASH) figure represents higher real earnings management. 
9 REP_CE- estimated as sales – cost of goods sold – selling, general and administration expenses. Depreciation and Amortization are 
excluded from Cost of Sales, Selling, General and Administrative Expenses. 
10 NOR_CE- is the core earnings that is actually expected to occur in the normal course of business activity devoid of classification shifting. 
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BENCHMARK, TENURE, CHANGE_GDP, INVESTMENT, NOA).
11
 The univariate results 
are similar to distributions in prior research.  Approximately, 69% of the Big 4 auditors 
examine the financial records of the firms, 48% of the firms reported loss in the last two years 
or the current financial year. Approximately, an average of 3 analysts follows the firms and 
2.9% of the firm-year observations are from rural counties.
12
 
 
4. RESEARCH DESIGN AND EMPIRICAL METHODOLOGY 
4.1 Earnings Management Metrics 
Due to the difficulty in detecting earnings management, in line with prior research, we use 
different measures to proxy for the three methods of earnings management.   
4.2 Measuring Accrual-Based Earnings Management 
We use the Modified-Jones model to estimate discretionary accruals in line with prior studies 
(Ball, 2013; Gerakos & Kovrijnykh, 2013; McGuire et al., 2012; Cohen and Zarowin, 2010; 
Dechow et al. 1995; Defond and Jiambalvo, 1994). This allows us to decompose 
discretionary accruals from non-discretionary accruals by adjusting change in sales for the 
change in receivables. Yearly, we estimate the model for every firm and industry classified 
by its 2-digit SIC code. This procedure partially enables us to regulate the changes in 
economic conditions that affect industries and total accruals so that the coefficients differ 
across time. Again, we subtract change in accounts receivables (     ) from change in sales 
(        ) before estimating the yearly residuals for all firm-year observations in the same 
two-digit SIC code. We estimate total accruals (     ) defined as income before 
                                                          
11 Consistent with McGuire et al., (2012), the correlations among religiosity (REL) and the demographic control variables in each county are 
mainly negative with the exception of residents in the counties who are affiliated with Republican Political Party and percentage of racial 
minority in each county, from the surveys by ASARB. Results are available under request. 
12 Consistent with McGuire et al. (2012), there is negative correlation between religiosity (REL) and accrual-based earnings management 
(ABNOR_ACCRUALS) but positive correlation between religiosity (REL) and proxies’ for real earnings management (REALMGMT1 and 
REALMGMT2). We also find positive correlation between religiosity (REL) and classification shifting (ABNOR_CORE) . This suggests 
that managers in highly religious environment are more likely to engage in classification shifting because: (i) there is an absence or limited 
external scrutiny and monitoring from auditors and regulators (ii) again, classification shifting does not change the bottom-line profit. The 
firm-level control variables are associated with ABNOR_ACCRUALS, REALMGMT1, REALMGMT2 and ABNOR_CORE. For example, 
SIZE is negatively correlated with religiosity (REL) and demonstrates the risk appetite of a firm manager who works in highly religious 
environment.  Again, SIZE, ROA and BIG4 are negatively and significantly correlated with ABNOR_ACCRULAS, which indicates that 
large firms with high ROA, that are audited by the BIG4 with close external monitoring are less likely to manage earnings through-accrual 
based earnings management. The correlations among the dependent variables, firm-level control variables and religiosity range from 
significant; less-significant to insignificant. Again, the correlation matrix shows that there is no multi-collineriaty between the variables used 
in the model because the co-efficients are very low. Therefore, we include all the variables in our model of estimation. The analysis will 
help explain the extent of the relationships and highlights the magnitude of including these control variables. 
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extraordinary items but after adjusting for operating cash flow scaled by lagged total assets. 
The Modified-Jones model is in the form of: 
 
 
     
      
    
 
      
     
               
      
     
     
      
      
 
(1) 
                               
Where       = EBXI-CASFO; where EBXI is the earnings before extraordinary items and 
discontinued operations; CASFO is the cash flow from operational activities scaled by 
      , (lagged total assets),           (change in sales) is scaled by       , lagged total 
assets,       is (change in accounts receivables) and       is net property, plant and 
equipment, scaled by        lagged total assets.     is the residuals representing the measure 
of earnings management as dependent variable in the model. In line with prior studies 
(Kothari et at., 2005; White, 1980), we use assets as a deflator to mitigate heteroskedasticity 
in residuals but not to eliminate it and also include a constant in the model estimation in order 
(i) to manage heteroskedasticity not dealt with by using assets as a deflator and (ii) to 
minimise the effect of omitted variables (Brown, Lo and Lys (1999). We use discretionary 
abnormal accruals and anticipate that religious managers would be less inclined to manipulate 
accruals and for that matter reported income upwards. Based on previous studies cited above 
on religiosity and earnings management, we predict a negative relationship between 
religiosity and abnormal accruals.    
 
In addition, in the robustness test, we estimate discretionary abnormal accruals using other 
definitions of accruals used in the literature. We replace total accruals estimated in the 
modified-Jones model in equation (1) by working capital accruals (WC_ACRUALS) defined 
as earnings before extraordinary items plus depreciation and amortisation minus cash flows 
from operating activities (Dechow et al., 2012; Peasnell et al., 1999). The revised modified-
Jones model is as follows:  
 
                 
 
      
     
               
      
     
     
      
                                                                       
 
(2) 
 
Where               = IB+DP- CASFO; and IB is the earnings before extraordinary 
items; DP are depreciation and amortisation and CASFO is cash flow from operational 
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activities. The COMPUSTAT data items for working capital estimations are = (Data18 + 
Data 14-Data 308). Kothari et al (2005) used performance-matched discretionary accruals 
and report that the modified-Jones model is severely mis-specified for samples of firms 
experiencing non-random performance. However, Dechow et al (2012) argue that Kothari et 
al (2005) performance-matched accruals model explains only 10%-12% of the variations in 
accruals and therefore distort the measure of discretionary accruals. They indicate further that 
Kothari et al (2005) performance-matching model is prone to management discretion and 
bias. Consequently, this study maintains the modified-Jones model and re-defines the 
measure of the discretionary abnormal accruals using working capital accruals to establish the 
association between religiosity and accruals based earnings management. 
 
4.3 Measuring Real Activities Earnings Management 
As in McGuire et al. (2012), we use two measures to proxy for real activities earnings 
management. Initially, we compute and aggregate abnormal cash flows (ABNOR_CASH), 
abnormal production costs (ABNOR_PCOST) and abnormal discretionary expenses 
(ABNOR_DEXP) for each firm and industry classified by its 2-digit SIC code using the 
model developed by Dechow et al. (1991). Abnormal Cash flows (ABNOR_CASH) is 
computed as the deviations from the predicted values from the industry-year regression. We 
run the following regression model for each industry and year in line with prior studies 
(McGuire et al. 2012; Zang, 2012; Cohen and Zarowin, 2010; Cohen et al. 2008; 
Roychowdhury, 2006). The following regression model is used: 
 
       
      
    
 
      
     
       
      
     
        
      
                                            
 
   (3) 
  
Where CASFO is the cash flow from operational activities (Data308 – Data124)       , 
lagged total assets,          is change in sales. As indicated above, sales represents annual 
sales revenue (Data 12) and total assets (Data6) is the aggregate of both non-current and 
current assets. The figure for (ABNOR_CASH) is multiplied by negative one (-1) in line with 
previous. Therefore, a higher (ABNOR_CASH) figure represents a higher real earnings 
management.  Again, we estimate abnormal production costs (ABNOR_PCOST) as the 
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deviations from predicted values from the industry-year regression. Following prior studies, 
the following regression model is used to compute abnormal production: 
 
       
      
    
 
      
     
           
      
     
        
      
   
          
      
          
 
(4) 
 
Where, PCOST is the aggregate of cost of sales (Data41) and change in inventory during the 
year (Data 3). The definitions of other variables in the model remain the same as above. 
Again, consistent with prior research (McGuire et al. 2012; Zang, 2012; Cohen and Zarowin, 
2010; Cohen et al. 2008; Roychowdhury, 2006) the figure for (ABNOR_PCOST) is 
multiplied by negative one (-1), consequently, a higher (ABNOR_PCOST) figure represents 
higher real earnings management.  
In addition, we model discretionary expenses as a function of lagged sales to avoid the 
problem of significantly lower residuals from running regression using current sales. 
Thereafter, abnormal discretionary expenses (ABNOR_DEXP) is computed from the 
predicted values from the industry-year regression. Following prior studies, we estimate 
abnormal discretionary expenses using the following regression model: 
 
       
      
    
 
      
     
         
      
                                         
 
 
   (5) 
Where D_EXP is the aggregate of advertising expenses (Data 45), R& D expenses (Data 46) 
and SG & A expenses (Data 189). Again, following previous studies (McGuire et al. 2012; 
Zang, 2012; Cohen and Zarowin, 2010; Cohen et al. 2008; Roychowdhury, 2006), where SG 
& A is available but advertising and R&D expenses are not available, the value of zero is 
given. Also, in line with prior studies, the figure for (ABNOR_DEXP) is multiplied by 
negative one (-1), consequently, a higher (ABNOR_DEXP) figure represents higher real 
earnings management.   
The residuals from abnormal cash flows (ABNOR_CASH), abnormal production cost 
(ABNOR_PCOST) and abnormal discretionary expenses (ABNOR_DEXP) are aggregated as 
proxies for two measures of real-earnings management. As previously indicated, firms that 
manipulate earnings upwards are characterised by unusually low cash flows from operations, 
low discretionary expenses and high production costs. As in prior studies, the first proxy to 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 20 
measure real activities earnings management is REALMGMT1, abnormal discretionary 
expenses (ABNOR_DEXP) is multiplied by negative (-1) and the results added to abnormal 
production cost (ABNOR_PCOST). The higher the aggregate of these two measures, the 
stronger the evidence that the firm is cutting expenses and therefore involved in real-activities 
earnings management. The second proxy for real-activities earnings management is 
REALMGMT2. Again, consistent with prior studies, we compute the aggregate of abnormal 
cash flows (ABNOR_CASH) and abnormal discretionary expenses (ABNOR_DEXP) after 
multiplying each of them by negative (-1). These measures are multiplied by negative one (-
1) to assess the extent of manipulations in sales and discretionary expenses as the higher the 
results, the more likely the firm is engaged in managing earnings upwards. Cohen and 
Zarowin (2010) observe that the individual variables to be used to compute the proxies for 
real activities earnings management has varying impact and therefore can change or provide 
misleading results when aggregated. In the robustness check, we report on both aggregated 
measures and individual proxies for real earnings management to assess the impact of 
religiosity on each of the proxies for real earnings management.  
 
4.4 Measuring Classification Shifting  
To estimate normal or expected core earnings (NOR_CE), we rely on McVay (2006) model 
as adopted by Fan et al. (2010). We focus on special items to assess the extent of earnings 
management and run the following regression model using both industry and fiscal year 
estimates to estimate unexpected core earnings
13
: 
 
                                                   
                                                        
 
(6) 
 
where;         is the current year core earnings, calculated as (Sales – Cost of Goods Sold 
– Selling, General and Administrative Expenses)/Sales.       is the lagged core earnings; 
     is the asset turnover ratio. Again, in line with prior studies (McVay, 2006; Fan et al., 
2010), we include             which is prior year operating accruals and           
which is current year accruals.         is change in sales and             is the 
                                                          
13 Unexpected core earnings and abnormal core earnings are used in this paper interchangeably.  
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percentage change in sales, where         is less than 0, otherwise zero. Model 6 is run 
cross-sectionally to obtain estimates for the coefficients which are then used to calculate 
normal core earnings for each firm using its variables. The unexpected core earnings 
(UNEXP_CE) is then computed as the difference between reported core earnings (REP_CE) 
and expected core earnings (NOR_CE) for each firm. Again, we run model (7) to test 
whether firms see classification shifting as a viable earnings management method. A positive 
relationship between unexpected core earnings and special items is an evidence of 
classification shifting. When firms’ engage in classification shifting, unexpected core 
earnings increases with special items and thus we expect    to be positive. 
                                                        
 
(7) 
where          , is the unexpected core earnings and               is income-
decreasing special items scaled by sales. Special item can be positive or negative, however, 
where special items are positive, it corresponds to income-decreasing otherwise income -
increasing and should be set to zero (Fan et al., 2010; McVay, 2006).  
 
Furthermore, we interact religiosity (REL) with special items (SPEC_ITEMS) to generate a 
new variable RELSPEC_ITEMS in model (8) to establish the relationship between religion 
and special items. We anticipate a positive association between religiosity and special items 
and therefore the coefficient of RELSPEC_ITEMS should be positive in line with the 
hypothesis.  
tt
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(8) 
We exclude current accruals from equation (6) in McVay (2006) model to assess the effect of 
religious social norms on classification shifting. Recent studies (Fan et al., 2010; Barua and 
Cready, 2008; McVay, 2008) attribute McVay’s estimation of expected core earnings to 
model bias because of the inclusion of contemporaneous accruals in the formation of 
expected core earnings values. These studies argue that the inclusion of current accruals 
results in the creation of a mechanical bias leading to a positive association between 
unexpected core earnings (dependent variable) and special items (independent variable). This 
therefore, suggests that the misclassification of core earnings into special items reported by 
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McVay (2006) is not classification shifting but symbolic of model bias. Thus, the Fan et al 
(2010) model without contemporaneous accruals is shown below: 
 
                                             
                                 
 
(9) 
 
In the further supplemental analyses, we estimate the validity and results for both McVay 
(2006) and Fan et al (2010) models to assess the impact of religiosity on classification 
shifting. 
5. Testing the Relationship between Religiosity and Earnings Management 
This study investigates the impact of religiosity on earnings management methods using 
McGuire et al. (2012) model to establish the extent to which religiosity of the firm’s 
environment affects earnings management. The model is in the form:  
 
                                         
                                                                       
                                                                             
                                               
                                                  
                                        
                                                                                             (10) 
  
  
 
The definitions of the variables are provided in the appendix. EARNINGSMGMT is used to 
proxy for accrual-based, real-activities and classification shifting earnings management. 
Firstly, we proxy for accruals-based earnings management and compute abnormal accruals 
(ABNOR_ACC) using the Modified-Jones model. We predict that there will be negative 
relationship between religiosity and accrual-based earnings management, that is, religious 
managers would be less inclined to manipulate accruals and for that matter reported income 
upwards. Prior studies (eg. McGuire et al. 2012; Hribar and Nicholas, 2007) observe that 
using absolute discretionary accruals can provide misleading results but making use of signed 
accruals establishes a clear association between managers religiosity and the method of 
managing earnings upwards.   
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In addition, we use two proxies to measure real activities earnings management by 
aggregating abnormal cash flows, abnormal production costs and abnormal discretionary 
expenses for each firm ((McGuire et al. 2012). The first of the two proxies for real earnings 
management is the aggregate of abnormal discretionary expenses and abnormal production 
cost (REALMGMT1). The second proxy for real earnings management is estimated as the 
total of abnormal discretionary expenses and abnormal cash flows (REALMGMT2) in line 
with prior research (Zang, 2012; McGuire et al. 2012; Cohen and Zarowin, 2010). To proxy 
for classification shifting, we examine the classification of core expenses into special items 
within the income statement as an earnings management tool (McVay, 2006; Fan et al., 
2010). Core expenses and special items are the main focus because core expenses are 
relatively steady, while special items are infrequent or unusual in nature (Fan et al., 2010; 
McVay, 2006; Doyle et al., 2003). Therefore, refusal to separate core expenses from special 
items has the potential to mislead users of financial statements in decision-making. We posit 
that managers in a highly religious environment wishing to maximise reported financial 
performance will be more inclined to misclassify core expenses into special items than using 
real-activities and accrual-based earnings because the former does not change GAAP 
earnings. Again, the bottom-line reported net income remains the same, thus misleading 
regulators and auditors not to scrutinize the income statement items (Fan et al. 2010; McVay, 
2006; Nelson et al. 2002). Initially, we focus on the relationship between unexpected core 
earnings (UNEXP_CE) and special items (SPEC_ITEMS) and predict a positive relationship 
between them. Thus income-decreasing special items are considered and the difference 
between expected core earnings and reported core earnings are estimated as unexpected core 
earnings.  
To test our hypotheses, we examine the coefficient of the religiosity of firms’ environment 
(REL) and expect that religious managers in their bid to improve performance and manage 
core earnings upwards will shift expenses that should be classified as core expenses to special 
items because they deem misclassification as more ethical, not fraudulent, and not subject to 
the scrutiny of auditors and regulators. Again, misclassification of core expenses does not 
change the bottom line reported profit. Therefore, we anticipate positive coefficient on REL 
and classification shifting; negative relationship between REL and accrual-based earnings 
management but positive association between REL and real earnings management. 
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Again, to assess that our initial results are not influenced by corporate governance, we control 
for corporate governance variables and exclude BIG4 auditors and audit tenure from our 
original model (model 10) above because of multi-collinearity. In particular, we use board 
size (BODSIZE), number of independent directors (BODIND), CEO tenure (CEOTEN) and 
audit committees (AUCOM) as proxies for corporate governance. Secondly, we examine the 
interaction between religiosity and corporate governance variables to assess their impact on 
earnings management by multiplying religiosity by the proxies for corporate governance to 
derive four new variables (RELBODSIZE; RELBODIND; RELAUCOM and RELCEOTEN) 
to be included in the model. 
 
5.1 Regression Results and Discussions 
Following the above, we run series of regressions using fixed effects to account for 
heterogeneity across firms. The summary of the final regression results of each dependent 
variable are presented in Table 4. Based on hypothesis 1, we show that religiosity (REL) is 
significantly and negatively associated with abnormal accruals (ABNOR_ACCRUALS; P-
value = 0.001), this indicates that religiosity in a firm’s environment mitigates accruals 
earnings management. This finding is consistent with (McGuire et al., 2012; Callen et al., 
2011; Dyreng et al., 2009) who observe that accruals based earnings management is frowned 
by highly religious managers because they deem it unethical business practice. Again, such 
earnings management are prone to regulators and auditors’ scrutiny. In contrast, in hypothesis 
2, we observe a positive association between religiosity and the two measures of real-
activities earnings management (REALMGMT1; P-value = 0.002 & REALMGMT2; P-value 
= 0.001), suggesting that managers in highly religious environment consider real-earnings 
management as less dangerous and morally upright than accruals manipulation because of 
limited scrutiny from external monitors. Again, real activities manipulation does not violate 
the GAAP and accounting regulations (McGuire et al. 2012).  
In line with hypothesis 3, we find that the impact of religiosity on classification shifting is 
significantly positive (ABNOR_CORE; P-value = 0.003). Previous research (Zalata and 
Roberts, 2015; Fan et al., 2010; McVay, 2006) observed that classification shifting and 
accruals based earnings management result from financial reporting decision. Therefore, it is 
possible that their association with religiosity of the firm’s environment will be the same and 
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for that matter negative. However, the result shows a positive association between 
classification shifting and religiosity of the firms’ environment because classification shifting 
does not change GAAP net income, is not subject to GAAP violation and scrutiny of external 
monitors. Also, future earnings are unaffected as there are no reversals in accruals or 
reduction in future earnings from lost opportunities (Athanasakou, Strong & Water, 2009). 
Therefore, it is possible that religious managers deem it acceptable and ethically correct to 
engage in misclassification of expenses to change the bottom line earnings. Our paper is the 
first to establish the association between religiosity and classification shifting. In the 
robustness test, we drop current accruals from McVay (2006) model in line with Fan et al 
(2010). However, the inferences remain the same. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 26 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 27 
TABLE 4: Relationship Between Religiosity and Accrual-Based, Real-Activities versus 
Classification Shifting Earnings Management 
 
 
Notes: We use *,**,*** in a two tailed test to respectively indicate statistical significance at 10 percent, 5 percent and 1 
percent levels; We estimate Model 1, 2, 3, and 4 using fixed effects regression; We show co-efficient estimates above and t-
VARIABLE ABNOR_ACC REALMGMT1 REALMGMT2 ABNOR_CORE 
     
CONSTANT    0.724*** 0.679*** 0.571**    0.560*** 
REL 
     -0.059*** 
(-3.406) 
  0.348*** 
(3.240) 
   0.049*** 
(3.396)) 
   0.095*** 
(2.850) 
SIZE 
    -0.067*** 
(-9.600) 
   -0.544*** 
(-11.660) 
  -0.556*** 
(-12.540) 
     -0.024*** 
(-3.102) 
ANALYST_FOL 
-0.004* 
(-1.648) 
-0.012 
(-0.770) 
-0.023 
(-1.580) 
-0.002 
(-0.640) 
ROA 
    -0.171*** 
(-3.263) 
    -0.951*** 
(-3.141) 
-0.395*** 
(-3.029) 
     -0.563*** 
(-9.670) 
LEV 
      0.092*** 
(4.530) 
0.248* 
(1.820) 
0.055 
(0.430) 
      0.074*** 
(3.250) 
BIG4 
  -0.011** 
(-2.090) 
-0.068 
(-1.040) 
-0.059 
(-0.920) 
-0.020* 
(-1.800) 
MBV 
     -0.013*** 
(-6.080) 
      -0.146*** 
(-10.150) 
-0.100*** 
(-7.400) 
       -0.036*** 
(-3.194) 
LOSS 
0.005 
(1.140) 
0.052* 
(1.760) 
0.073** 
(2.580) 
      0.027*** 
(5.470) 
OPERA_RISK 
     0.014*** 
(6.490) 
    0.037*** 
(2.620) 
   0.041*** 
(2.990) 
     0.005** 
(2.030) 
RURAL 
0.005 
(1.530) 
-0.024 
(-1.050) 
-0.015 
(-0.720) 
-0.005 
(-1.400) 
BENCHMARK 
0.034 
(0.630) 
-0.644* 
(-1.770) 
-0.532 
(-1.550) 
0.102 
(1.600) 
TENURE 
-0.002 
(-0.560) 
-0.009 
(-0.510) 
-0.002 
(-0.110) 
-0.000 
(-0.170) 
CHANGE_GDP 
-0.000 
(-0.040) 
-0.012* 
(-1.910) 
-0.007 
(-1.280) 
-0.001 
(-0.950) 
INVESTMENT 
   -0.378*** 
(-9.830) 
0.498* 
(1.940) 
0.147 
(0.600) 
      0.466** 
(2.100) 
NOA 
   0.030*** 
(4.930) 
  0.106** 
(2.580) 
   0.169*** 
(4.320) 
     0.030** 
(2.380) 
POPN 
-1.110 
(1.570) 
-0.864 
(-0.180) 
-0.353 
(-0.520) 
0.522 
(0.660) 
INCOME 
 -0.121** 
(-2.600) 
-0.544* 
(-1.750) 
-0.418 
(-1.420) 
-0.031 
  (-0.600) 
EDUC 
   -0.550*** 
(-5.010) 
  -0.989*** 
(-4.120) 
-0.633*** 
(-6.650) 
      1.169*** 
(9.570) 
AGE 
   0.556*** 
(4.570) 
 0.660** 
(2.040) 
   0.781*** 
(3.600) 
-0.615*** 
(-4.540) 
POLITICAL 
   0.002** 
(2.690) 
0.001 
(0.200) 
0.001 
(-0.020) 
-0.001 
(-1.440) 
MINORITY 
-0.019 
(-1.020) 
0.156 
(1.240) 
0.117 
(0.980) 
0.042** 
(1.990) 
Industry Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 8,605 7,966 8,605 8,573 
R-square (overall) 0.34 0.09 0.15 0.26 
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statistics below in brackets; ABNOR_ACCRUALS = measure of abnormal accruals using the Modified-Jones model in 
equation 1; REALMGMT1 = calculated as the aggregate of abnormal discretionary expenditures (ABNOR_DEXP) and 
abnormal production costs (ABNOR_PCOST). REALMGMT2 = calculated as the aggregate of abnormal discretionary 
expenditure (ABNOR_DEXP) and abnormal cash flows (ABNOR_CASH). The higher the value for REALMGMT1 and 
REALMGMT2, the higher the level of real earnings management (Cohen and Zarowin, 2010). ABNOR_CORE or 
UNEXP_CE = computed as the difference between reported core earnings (REP_CE) and expected core earnings 
(NOR_CE) for each firm (McVay, 2006). All other variables are defined above and in the Appendix A. 
 
We find that the firm-level control variables are associated with the managers methods of 
managing earnings. For example, ROA is negatively and significantly (1%) related to 
abnormal accruals, real-activities and classification shifting earnings manipulations, 
suggesting that managers in religious environment are more likely to manage reported 
earnings upwards when the firm performs poorly. Again, analyst following 
(ANALYST_FOL) is negatively related to three dependent variables but insignificantly 
related to ABNOR_CORE, suggesting that religious managers are less likely to manage 
reported earnings when analysts monitor their performance. Similarly, SIZE is negatively and 
significantly (at 1% level) associated with our proxies for earnings management, indicating 
that the sample includes larger firms than smaller firms. Ashbaugh et al. (2003) observe that 
small firms are more likely to manipulate reported profits than large firms. Thus, the impact 
of earnings management decreases, the greater the size of the firm. Again, we observe a 
positive and significant relationship at 1% level between leverage (LEV) and our proxies for 
earnings management because DeFond and Jiambalvo (1994) indicate that managers 
manipulate reported earnings upwards to meet debt covenants or contracts. Also, we find a 
positive association between LOSS and our proxies for earnings management consistent with 
prior research. For example, Francis and Yu (2009) observe that firms that made a loss in the 
previous years are more likely to manage earnings upwards in the current year and those with 
profits in the previous years have the tendency to manipulate profits downwards.  
The remaining firm-level control variables exhibit their expected sign and significant levels. 
For example, NOA is positively (at 1% significant level) related ABNOR_ACCRUALS, 
ABNOR_CORE and REALMGMT2 but positively related to REALMGMT1 at 10% 
significant level. Additionally, BIG4 and TENURE show a weak negative relationship with 
ABNOR_ACCRUALS and ABNOR_CORE suggesting that religious managers decrease 
accruals earnings management where external monitoring from BIG4 is high but have the 
tendency to increase or decrease real activities manipulation due to limited scrutiny from 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 29 
auditors and regulators. The remaining firm-level and demographic control variables 
maintain their expected sign and level of significance.       
5.2 Impact in High and Low Religious Areas 
The above results and analyses have provided a clear evidence that religiosity of the firm’s 
environment influences earnings management practices positively or negatively. However, 
the analyses do not reveal the extent to which the level (high or low) of religiosity in an area 
will affect earnings management practices. We test this by empirically breaking down the 
datasets into two samples, comprising of high and low religious areas and define areas with 
above (below) the median religiosity figure of 52% in our sample as having high (low) 
religiosity respectively. We expect that a highly religious environment will influence earnings 
management practices more significantly than areas with low religiosity figures
14
.     
Table 5 below, presents the results of the analysis of high and low religious areas on firm 
managers’ method of earnings management. Four proxies for earnings management are used 
to run separate regressions. Interestingly, we observe a strong positive or negative association 
at 1% significant level (P< 0.01) between religiosity and all methods of earnings management 
in high religiosity areas. At the high religiosity areas, inferences still remain the same. Thus, 
religiosity is negative and significant for accrual-based earnings manipulation but positive 
and significant for both real- activities and classification shifting earnings management. Not 
surprisingly, the study notes that the association between religiosity at the low areas and 
earnings management methods is positively or negatively weak at 10% significance level. 
This suggests and reinforces the findings that religious social norms has influence on 
earnings management, and that the effect is acute especially in a highly religious 
environment.  
 
 
 
 
                                                          
14 We break our sample into high and low religiosity reas because prior studies (McGuire et al., 2012; Callen et al., 2011; Dyreng et al., 
2009) indicate that a highly religious environment  has significant influence on attitudes and behaviour of the people living in that 
environment. 
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TABLE 5: High Religiosity Areas versus Low Religiosity Areas 
Variables ABNOR_ACC REALMGMT1 REALMGMT2 ABNOR_CORE 
 HIGH LOW HIGH LOW HIGH LOW HIGH LOW 
CONSTANT 0.518*** 0.061*** 0.335** 0.116* 0.180** 0.080** 0.340** 0.022* 
REL 
-0.068*** 
(-4.133) 
-0.043* 
(-1.760) 
0.269*** 
(4.480) 
0.132* 
(1.774) 
0.080*** 
(3.670) 
0.056* 
(1.750) 
0.325*** 
(4.067) 
0.010* 
(1.802) 
SIZE 
- 0.051*** 
(-5.780) 
-0.024** 
(-2.280) 
-0.514** 
(-8.760) 
-0.102 
(-1.010) 
0.524*** 
(9.490) 
0.183* 
(1.900) 
-0.023*** 
(-3.450) 
-0.040** 
(2.040) 
ANALYST_FOL 
-0.005* 
(-1.730) 
-0.001 
(-0.140) 
-0.013 
(-0.640) 
-0.026 
(-0.890) 
-0.035* 
(-1.800) 
-0.028 
(-1.020) 
-0.003 
(-0.970) 
-0.003 
(-0.590) 
ROA 
- 0.091*** 
(-5.765) 
-0.015*** 
(-2.610) 
-0.317*** 
(-6.020) 
-0.81** 
(-2.160) 
-0.079** 
(-4.620) 
-0.049** 
(-3.790) 
-0.553*** 
(-8.490) 
-0.439*** 
(-3.250) 
LEV 
  0.12*** 
(4.920) 
0.045* 
(1.870) 
0.360** 
(2.250) 
0.060 
(0.210) 
0.185 
(1.220) 
0.200 
(0.740) 
 0.088*** 
(3.250) 
0.080* 
(1.740) 
BIG4 
-0.005 
(-0.360) 
-0.016 
(-0.790) 
-0.114 
(-1.380) 
-0.111 
(-1.060) 
-0.093 
(-1.160) 
-0.127 
(-1.230) 
-0.002 
(-0.120) 
-0.029 
(-1.390) 
MBV 
0.015*** 
(5.710) 
0.013*** 
(2.660) 
0.160*** 
(9.300) 
0.118** 
(2.270) 
0.121*** 
(7.450) 
0.058** 
(2.270) 
0.036*** 
(12.290) 
0.037** 
(2.180) 
LOSS 
0.011** 
(1.980) 
0.009 
(0.990) 
0.039 
(1.070) 
0.008 
(0.160) 
0.046 
(1.340) 
0.050 
(1.030) 
0.046*** 
(4.630) 
0.015** 
(2.370) 
OPERA_RISK 
0.014*** 
(5.420) 
0.013*** 
(2.660) 
0.054*** 
(3.190) 
0.028 
(1.080) 
0.055*** 
(3.380) 
0.050* 
(1.980) 
0.006** 
(2.130) 
0.001 
(0.180) 
BENCHMARK 
0.045 
(0.760) 
0.016 
(0.120) 
-0.930** 
(-2.340) 
-0.988 
(-1.380) 
-0.982*** 
(-2.620) 
-0.409 
(-0.610) 
-0.157** 
(-2.340) 
-0.102 
(-0.750) 
TENURE 
-0.002 
(-0.520) 
-0.006 
(-1.060) 
-0.016 
(-0.730) 
-0.037 
(-1.200) 
-0.008 
(-0.400) 
-0.034 
(-1.140) 
-0.003 
(-0.730) 
-0.004 
(-0.660) 
CHANGE_GDP 
-0.001 
(-0.840) 
-0.002 
(-0.790) 
-0.007 
(-0.940) 
-0.016 
(-1.530) 
-0.004 
(-0.650) 
-0.011 
(-1.160) 
-0.001 
(-0.520) 
-0.001 
(-0.160) 
INVESTMENT 
-0.471*** 
(-9.900) 
-0.268*** 
(-3.420) 
0.793** 
(2.510) 
0.584 
(1.360) 
0.512* 
(1.720) 
0.825 
(0.220) 
0.528*** 
(9.890) 
0.473*** 
(5.630) 
NOA 
0.037*** 
(4.770) 
0.018 
(1.250) 
0.021*** 
(3.400) 
0.250** 
(2.090) 
0.102** 
(2.120) 
0.296*** 
(3.820) 
0.020*** 
(2.610) 
0.042* 
(1.980) 
Demo. Control 
Variables 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
Industry Fixed 
Effects 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
Observations 5939 2666 5505 2461 5939 2666 5915 2658 
Adj. R-square 0.25 0.15 0.16 0.05 0.22 0.04 0.17 0.05 
Notes: We use *, **, *** in a two tailed test to respectively indicate statistical significance at 10 percent, 5 percent and 1 
percent levels. Areas with above (below) the median religiosity figure of 52% in our sample are classified as having high 
(low) religiosity respectively. We estimate Model 1, 2, 3, and 4 using fixed effects regression. We show co-efficient 
estimates above and t-statistics below in brackets. ABNOR_ACCRUALS = measure of abnormal accruals using the Modified-
Jones model in equation 1; REALMGMT1 = calculated as the aggregate of abnormal discretionary expenditures 
(ABNOR_DEXP) and abnormal production costs (ABNOR_PCOST); REALMGMT2 = calculated as the aggregate of 
abnormal discretionary expenditure (ABNOR_DEXP) and abnormal cash flows (ABNOR_CASH). The higher the value for 
REALMGMT1 and REALMGMT2, the higher the level of real earnings management; ABNOR_CORE or UNEXP_CE = 
computed as the difference between reported core earnings (REP_CE) and expected core earnings (NOR_CE) for each firm 
(McVay, 2006); All other variables are defined above and in the Appendix A. 
 
5.3 Religiosity in Rural and Urban Areas 
Furthermore, we disaggregate the sample into rural and urban areas. Prior studies observe 
that earnings quality is associated with firms in rural areas (McGuire et al. 2012; Ucran, 
2007). This point is further strengthened when firms in rural areas are audited by the BIG4 
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auditors and have strong internal controls (Bayley and Taylor, 2007; Dechow et al., 2010). To 
indicate that religious social norms have influence on firms located in urban areas and that 
our results are not solely due to the higher earnings quality of the firms located in rural areas, 
we break the sample into urban and rural areas. In line with Loughran and Schulz (2005)
15
, 
we classify Metropolitan Statistical Area (MSA) in each county with over five million 
population as urban area and repeat the main test using the urban subsample, comprising of 
MSA areas within the county with an average population of over five million residents. 
TABLE 6:  Religiosity and Earnings Management in Urban Areas 
VARIABLE ABNOR_ACC RAELMGMT1 REALMGMT2 ABNOR_CORE 
CONSTANT 0.368** 0.157** 0.131** 0.160** 
REL 
    -0.054** 
(-2.370) 
   0.480*** 
(2.810) 
    0.092*** 
(3.170) 
0.129** 
(2.110) 
SIZE 
     0.057*** 
(7.060) 
0.504*** 
(9.150) 
   0.513*** 
(9.780) 
0.017* 
(1.920) 
ANALYST_FOL 
-0.005* 
(-1.670) 
-0.031 
(-1.640) 
-0.043** 
(-2.440) 
0.004 
(1.400) 
ROA 
      - 0.075*** 
(-8.920) 
-0.075*** 
(-6.510) 
  -0.156*** 
(-5.380) 
-0.582*** 
(-8.470) 
LEV 
     0.118*** 
(4.870) 
0.259 
(1.580) 
0.022 
(0.140) 
  0.075*** 
(2.780) 
BIG4 
-0.020* 
(-1.660) 
-0.072 
(-0.930) 
0.091 
(1.180) 
0.017 
(1.290) 
MBV 
      0.013*** 
(5.150) 
0.125*** 
(7.330) 
    0.084*** 
(5.240) 
0.034*** 
(12.430) 
LOSS 
0.004 
(0.770) 
0.064* 
(1.830) 
  0.075** 
(2.250) 
0.025*** 
(4.420) 
OPERA_RISK 
      0.015*** 
(5.780) 
0.025 
(1.500) 
  0.028* 
 (1.720) 
0.005* 
(1.690) 
BENCHMARK 
0.047 
(0.740) 
0.878** 
(-2.020) 
-0.736* 
 (-1.790) 
-0.120* 
(-1.700) 
TENURE 
-0.002 
(-0.560) 
-0.021 
(-0.960) 
-0.017 
(-0.850) 
-0.002 
(-0.540) 
CHANGE_GDP 
-0.001 
(-0.040) 
-0.013* 
(-1.760) 
-0.007 
(-0.990) 
-0.001 
(-0.700) 
INVESTMENT 
-0.392*** 
(-8.570) 
0.194 
(0.620) 
0.169 
(0.570) 
0.542*** 
(10.700) 
NOA 
0.002*** 
(2.970) 
0.165*** 
(3.380) 
0.223*** 
(4.760) 
0.031*** 
(3.870) 
Demographic Cont. 
Variables 
Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry Fixed 
Effects 
Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 6612 6111 6612 6586 
Adj. R-square 
(overall) 
0.19 0.07 0.13 0.18 
 
                                                          
15 Loughran and Schulz (2005) define urban areas as the most-populated areas with an average of over five million residents in the MSA 
within the county. We replicate our analysis based on their definition and find that the inferences remain the same. 
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Notes: We use *,**,*** in a two tailed test to respectively indicate statistical significance at 10 percent, 5 percent and 1 
percent levels; we use a sub-sample of firms in urban areas classified as MSA in each county with over five million 
population in line with Loughran and Schulz (2005); we estimate Model 1, 2, 3, and 4 using fixed effects regression; we 
show co-efficient estimates above and t-statistics below in brackets. ABNOR_ACCRUALS = measure of abnormal accruals 
using the Modified-Jones model in equation 1; REALMGMT1 = calculated as the aggregate of abnormal discretionary 
expenditures (ABNOR_DEXP) and abnormal production costs (ABNOR_PCOST); REALMGMT2 = calculated as the 
aggregate of abnormal discretionary expenditure (ABNOR_DEXP) and abnormal cash flows (ABNOR_CASH). The higher 
the value for REALMGMT1 and REALMGMT2, the higher the level of real earnings management; ABNOR_CORE or 
UNEXP_CE = computed as the difference between reported core earnings (REP_CE) and expected core earnings 
(NOR_CE) for each firm (McVay, 2006); All other variables are defined above and in the Appendix A. 
 
 
Table 6 above, presents the results of the analysis of the relationship between religiosity and 
earnings management for firms located in urban areas of all U.S. counties. Indeed, the 
conclusions remain the same using only the urban area subsample. We find that religiosity is 
negatively and significantly (at 5% level) associated with accrual-based earnings 
management but positively and significantly (at 1% level) associated with both real activities 
and classification shifting earnings management. This suggests that the findings in respect of 
the association between religious social norms and earnings management methods are not 
solely influenced by the earnings quality associated with rural and urban areas. The findings 
are robust and clearly demonstrate that religiosity of urban firms’ environment impacts 
positively and negatively on the earnings management practices in the U.S.  
 
5.4 Religiosity and Corporate Governance 
Recently, Zalata and Roberts (2015) find that classification shifting is less common in firms 
with more independent directors and directors with long tenure but negative association exists 
between audit committees, large board size, CEOs with long tenure and classification 
shifting. Indeed, literature review shows that a firm’s corporate governance mechanism 
affects earnings management practices (Hossain et al. 2011, Lin and Hwang, 2010; Harris 
and Raviv, 2008). Therefore, we interact religiosity with corporate governance variables to 
assess their impact on earnings management.  
 
Table 7 presents the association between religiosity, corporate governance variables and 
earnings management.  
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TABLE 7:  Religiosity with Corporate Governance Variables 
VARIABLE ABNOR_ACC RAELMGMT1 REALMGMT2 ABNOR_CORE 
CONSTANT 0.538*** 0.479** 0.422** 0.490*** 
REL 
      -0.084*** 
(-5.260) 
 0.259** 
(2.408) 
   0.040** 
(2.390) 
     0.042*** 
(2.640) 
BODSIZE 
     -0.031*** 
(-2.120) 
-0.024** 
(-2.230) 
-0.094** 
(-2.020) 
-0.099** 
(-2.310) 
BODIND 
    -0.293*** 
(-2.703) 
    -0.097** 
(-2.420) 
     -0.086** 
(-2.190) 
 -0.017*** 
(-2.720) 
AUCOM 
  -0.017** 
(-2.420) 
    -0.042** 
(-2.030) 
-0.068 
(-1.449) 
-0.017 
(-0.510) 
CEOTEN 
0.294 
(1.350) 
0.047 
(1.190) 
    0.077** 
(2.040) 
0.074 
(1.120) 
RELBODSIZE 
    -0.135*** 
(-3.270) 
    -0.054** 
(-2.130) 
-0.088** 
(-2.009) 
-0.025** 
(-2.300) 
RELBODIND 
     -0.076*** 
(-3.868) 
     -0.087** 
(-2.090) 
   -0.016** 
(-1.980) 
     -0.057*** 
(-2.710) 
RELAUCOM 
      -0.275*** 
(-3.346) 
  -0.066** 
(-2.040) 
-0.075 
(-1.580) 
-0.036 
(-0.590) 
RELCEOTEN 
    0.075** 
 (2.360) 
0.013 
(1.220) 
    0.020** 
(2.040) 
0.019 
(1.090) 
SIZE 
   -0.034** 
(-2.190) 
      0.055*** 
(3.660) 
      0.055*** 
(3.500) 
-0.008 
(-1.040) 
ANALYST_FOL 
-0.066 
(-1.480) 
-0.013 
(-0.810) 
-0.024 
(-1.570) 
-0.002 
(-0.740) 
ROA 
     -0.004*** 
(-4.690) 
      -0.095*** 
(-8.360) 
      -0.039*** 
(-7.180) 
       -0.061*** 
(-9.640) 
LEV 
0.170 
(1.350) 
0.252 
(1.550) 
0.058 
(0.440) 
      0.075*** 
(3.280) 
MBV 
0.093 
(1.550) 
0.252 
(1.110) 
  0.396* 
(1.920) 
0.036 
(1.090) 
LOSS 
     0.013*** 
(2.600) 
0.053** 
(2.470) 
      0.099*** 
(3.360) 
      0.027*** 
(5.480) 
OPERA_RISK 
 0.005** 
(2.170) 
0.039 
(1.600) 
      0.073*** 
(2.590) 
  0.005* 
(1.940) 
BENCHMARK 
0.014 
(1.480) 
-0.637 
(-1.630) 
0.042 
(1.070) 
0.099 
(1.650) 
CHANGE_GDP 
0.035 
(0.640) 
-0.012 
(-0.960) 
-0.529 
(-1.550) 
-0.001 
(-0.940) 
INVESTMENT 
-0.004 
(-0.420) 
0.485 
(0.890) 
0.002 
(0.120) 
0.468 
(0.940) 
NOA 
  0.377* 
(1.820) 
         0.108*** 
    (2.620) 
0.008 
(1.320) 
    0.030*** 
(4.310) 
Demographic Control 
Variables 
Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 8605 7966 8,605 8,573 
R-square (overall) 0.29 0.08 0.13 0.21 
 
Notes: we use *,**,*** in a two tailed test to respectively indicate statistical significance at 10 percent, 5 percent and 1 
percent levels; we estimate Model 1, 2, 3, and 4 using fixed effects regression; we show co-efficient estimates above and t-
statistics below in brackets. ABNOR_ACCRUALS = measure of abnormal accruals using the Modified-Jones model in 
equation 1; REALMGMT1 = calculated as the aggregate of abnormal discretionary expenditures (ABNOR_DEXP) and 
abnormal production costs (ABNOR_PCOST); REALMGMT2 = calculated as the aggregate of abnormal discretionary 
expenditure (ABNOR_DEXP) and abnormal cash flows (ABNOR_CASH). The higher the value for REALMGMT1 and 
REALMGMT2, the higher the level of real earnings management (Cohen and Zarowin, 2010); ABNOR_CORE or 
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UNEXP_CE = computed as the difference between reported core earnings (REP_CE) and expected core earnings 
(NOR_CE) for each firm (McVay, 2006); BODSIZE  = total number of directors on the board; BODIND = calculated as the 
number of independent directors divided by the total number of directors on the board; AUCOM = a dummy variable coded 
as 1 if the company has an audit committee, otherwise zero; CEOTEN = measured as the number of years a CEO has held 
the position as CEO in the firm; RELBODSIZE = religiosity multiplied by board size; RELBODIND = religiosity multiplied 
by board independence; RELAUCOM = religiosity multiplied by audit committee; RELCEOTEN = religiosity multiplied by 
CEO turnover; All other variables are defined above and in the Appendix A. 
 
We find a significantly negative relationship (at 1% level, p-value = 0.000) between 
religiosity and accrual-based earnings management, at 5% significant level between 
religiosity, board size and audit committee but 10% negative association between board 
independence and accrual-based earnings management. However, the relationship between 
CEO tenure and accrual-based earnings management was negatively insignificant. The firm 
level and demographic control variables maintain their expected signs and coefficients. 
Clearly, results in table 7 indicate that religiosity influences earnings management practices 
despite the inclusion of corporate governance variables. However, the coefficient and t-values 
change from -0.059 and -3.406 to -0.084 and -5.260 respectively. This suggests that both 
religiosity and corporate governance variables play a complementary role in mitigating 
accruals-based earnings management in column 2. Therefore, our initial results are supported 
that there is a significantly negative association between religious social norms and accruals-
based earnings management. Our study report that firms with high religious social norms 
coupled with good corporate governance mitigate accrual earnings management and the 
converse is true.   
Again, inferences remain the same for real activities and classification shifting earnings 
management. In table 7 columns 3 and 4, there is a significantly (P < 0.05) positive 
association between religiosity and both measures of real activities management. The 
coefficient and t-values without governance variables for REALMGMT2 reduced from 0.049 
to 0.040 and 3.396 to 2.390 respectively. Even though corporate governance mitigates 
earnings management, with real-activities and classification shifting, the impact becomes 
relatively less pronounced.  
Interestingly, in column 5, we find that the association between classification shifting and 
religious social norms is still positively significant at 1% (p < 0.001). Thus with or without 
corporate governance variables, the results and conclusion remain the same. Thus even with 
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good corporate governance, religious social norms still impact positively on real activities 
and classification shifting earnings management at 5% and 1% level of significance 
respectively. Therefore, the results suggest that the lack of both internal and external 
monitoring (from auditors and regulators) coupled with the fact that there is no GAAP 
violation when firms engage in both real-activities and classification shifting facilitates these 
methods of earnings management. This finding is consistent with prior research which 
indicate that the presence of BIG4 and regulators do not mitigate real activities-based 
earnings management (McGuire et al. 2012). We contribute to existing few studies that 
religious social norms impact positively and significantly on classification shifting and this 
association is even the same when the firm has good corporate governance mechanism in 
place.   
In addition, we observe a negative association between the governance variables (BODSIZE, 
BODIND and AUCOM) and measures of real earnings management at 5% (p < 0.05) but a 
positively (significant or insignificant) association between CEOTEN and methods of 
earnings management, suggesting that CEOs with long tenure wield substantial influence and 
power to influence earnings management outcome to boost reported earnings.  Again, we find 
that the results for RELBODSIZE; RELBODIND and RELAUCOM show a significantly 
negative association at 1% or 5% between RELBODSIZE; RELBODIND, RELAUCOM and 
the methods of earnings management. Even though the relationship is negative, 
RELAUCOM is insignificant for classification shifting. This finding is consistent with prior 
studies (Zalata and Roberts, 2015; Hossain et al. 2011) and indicates that effective corporate 
governance mechanism in an organisation has negative impact on earnings management 
practices. Notwithstanding, the results show that religiosity of the firms’ environment has the 
potential to shape the attitudes and behaviour of firms’ managers even when there is a good 
corporate governance mechanism in operation. On the other hand, the results demonstrate 
that the influence of religious social norms serves as other form of monitoring for 
stakeholders and complement the existing governance mechanism instituted by management 
in curbing accruals earnings management within a firm (Ayers, Ramalingegowda and Yeung, 
2011; Burns, Kedia and Lipson, 2010). However, even with good corporate governance 
mechanism in place, earnings management through real activities and classification shifting is 
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pervasive and significant in an environment where religious social norms influences 
managerial behaviour and decisions. 
6 Association between Religiosity and Alternative measures of Earnings Management 
We also conduct further robustness tests to support the results using alternative measures of 
earnings management. 
6.1 Validity of McVay’s (2006) Model 
 
We use Fan et al (2010) model which excludes contemporaneous accruals from McVay’s 
(2006) model to avoid potential bias. We estimate the results for both McVay (2006) model 
and Fan et al (2010) model as shown in Table 8 below. Even though, we drop 
contemporaneous accruals from the McVay's model, unexpected core earnings are still 
positively related to special items, which is an evidence of classification shifting. The 
inferences remain the same as the coefficients and significance levels of Fan et al (2010) 
model are analogous to those observe under the McVay’s (2006) model. Again, the firm level 
and demographic control variables maintain their expected signs and coefficients. In both 
models, we find that religiosity is positive and significantly (P < 0.001) associated with 
classification shifting. This means that the results in Table 8, column 2 without current year 
accruals in Fan et al (2010) model is a clear confirmation that our initial findings of 
misclassification of core expenses into special items rooted in McVay's (2006) expectation 
model is not determined by model bias.  
 
Furthermore, we surrogate total accruals by working capital accruals in both McVay’s (2006) 
and Fan et al (2010) expectation models. Athanasakou et al. (2009) observe that the 
substitution of working capital accruals is important because total accruals in the McVay's 
(2006) model comprise of depreciation expenses and special items accruals which are likely 
to introduce bias into the expectation model. Therefore, we re-estimate the regression results 
and find that the coefficients and significant levels are similar to the initial results.  
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TABLE 8:  Religiosity and Classification Shifting 
VARIABLE McVay  (2006) 
Model 
Fan et al (2010) 
Model 
Constant      0.560***     0.483*** 
REL 
    0.095*** 
(2.850) 
    0.098*** 
(3.150) 
SIZE 
  -0.024** 
(-3.102) 
    -0.022** 
(-2.330) 
ANALYST_FOL 
-0.002 
(-0.640) 
    -0.004 
 (-1.300) 
ROA 
  -0.563*** 
(-9.670) 
      -0.126*** 
  (-8.750) 
LEV 
     0.074*** 
(3.250) 
       0.022*** 
  (3.380) 
BIG4 
-0.020* 
(-1.800) 
 -0.023 
    (-1.630) 
MBV 
    0.036*** 
(3.194) 
       0.058*** 
  (4.370) 
LOSS 
    0.027*** 
(5.470) 
    0.006*** 
(4.080) 
OPERA_RISK 
0.005** 
(2.030) 
0.117 
(1.610) 
RURAL 
-0.005 
(-1.400) 
-0.003 
(-0.790) 
BENCHMARK 
0.102 
(1.600) 
0.002 
(0.970) 
TENURE 
-0.000 
(-0.170) 
 -0.102 
(-0.620) 
CHANGE_GDP 
-0.001 
(-0.950) 
-0.056 
(-0.620) 
INVESTMENT 
   0.466** 
(2.100) 
   0.024* 
(1.730) 
NOA 
      0.030** 
(2.380) 
    0.004** 
 (2.300) 
Demographic Control Variables Yes Yes 
Industry Fixed Effects Yes Yes 
Observations 8,573 8,573 
Adjusted R-square (overall) 0.26 0.23 
Notes: We use *,**,*** in a two tailed test to respectively indicate statistical significance at 10 percent, 5 percent and 1 
percent levels; we estimate McVay (2006) and Fan et al. (2010) models  using fixed effects regression16; we show co-
efficient estimates above and t-statistics below in brackets; All other variables are defined above and in the Appendix A. 
 
6.2 Alternative Measures of Real Activities Earnings Management and Religiosity 
Further sensitivity analyses are also conducted using individual measures of real activities 
earnings management. Specifically, abnormal production costs, (ABNOR_PCOST); 
abnormal discretionary expenses (ABNOR_DEXP) and abnormal cash flows 
                                                          
16 In McVay's (2006) model, ABNOR_CORE or UNEXP_CE is computed using total accruals but Fan et al. (2010) model excludes 
contemporaneous accruals from the McVay's model to avoid potential model bias; 
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(ABNOR_CASFO) are used as dependent variables and proxies for real activities based 
earnings management. Cohen and Zarowin (2010) observe that aggregating these three 
individual variables to compute REALMGMT1 and REALMGMT2 might influence earnings 
and weaken the results. Table 9 below provides results for aggregated and individual 
measures of real-activities based earnings management. 
TABLE 9:  Religiosity and Real Activities Measures 
VARIABLE RAELMGM
T1 
REALMGMT 
2 
ABNOR_ 
PCOST 
ABNOR_ 
DEXP 
ABNOR_ 
CASFO 
CONSTANT 0.679*** 0.571** 0.242** 0.257**  0.050** 
 
REL 
    0.348*** 
(3.240) 
    0.049*** 
(3.396) 
   0.106*** 
(2.680) 
    0.240*** 
(3.200) 
    0.157*** 
         (2.580) 
SIZE 
   -0.544*** 
(-11.660) 
  -0.556*** 
(-12.540) 
  -0.110*** 
(-3.500) 
     -0.072*** 
  (-5.050) 
  -0.182*** 
(-8.090) 
ANALYST_FOL 
-0.012 
(-0.770) 
-0.023 
(-1.580) 
-0.023** 
(-2.100) 
 -0.036** 
(-2.220) 
-0.017** 
(-2.280) 
ROA 
    -0.951*** 
(-3.141) 
 -0.395*** 
(-3.029) 
    -0.029*** 
(-3.470) 
    -0.056*** 
(-4.360) 
  -0.030*** 
(-3.620) 
LEV 
0.248* 
(1.820) 
0.055 
(0.430) 
   0.045* 
(1.750) 
0.005 
(0.040) 
    0.275*** 
(4.190) 
BIG4 
-0.068 
(-1.040) 
-0.059 
(-0.920) 
-0.100 
 (-0.230) 
-0.107 
  (-1.570) 
-0.011 
(-0.360) 
MBV 
      -0.146*** 
(-10.150) 
    -0.100*** 
(-7.400) 
   -0.94*** 
(-9.490) 
    -0.051*** 
  (-3.530) 
    -0.122*** 
  (-7.770) 
LOSS 
0.052* 
(1.760) 
  0.073** 
(2.580) 
0.014* 
(1.670) 
     0.079** 
(2.590) 
0.025* 
(1.770) 
OPERA_RISK 
    0.037*** 
(2.620) 
   0.041*** 
(2.990) 
   0.015** 
(2.470) 
0.008 
(1.540) 
    0.031*** 
(4.380) 
RURAL 
-0.024 
(-1.050) 
-0.015 
(-0.720) 
-0.021 
  (-1.020) 
-0.010 
(-0.620) 
-0.012 
(-0.520) 
BENCHMARK 
-0.644* 
(-1.770) 
-0.532 
(-1.550) 
0.023 
  (0.920) 
-.0775** 
(-2.110) 
-0.028 
(-0.160) 
TENURE 
-0.009 
(-0.510) 
-0.002 
(-0.110) 
-0.001 
(-0.100) 
-0.026 
(-1.420) 
-0..001 
(-0.111) 
CHANGE_GDP 
-0.012* 
(-1.910) 
-0.007 
(-1.280) 
     -0.011*** 
(-2.590) 
-0.005 
(-0.740) 
-0.006** 
(-2.060) 
INVESTMENT 
0.498* 
(1.940) 
0.147 
(0.600) 
    0.077** 
(1.960) 
      0.840*** 
(3.200) 
  -0.097*** 
(9.670) 
NOA 
  0.106** 
(2.580) 
   0.169*** 
(4.320) 
0.710** 
(2.500) 
     0.226*** 
(5.370) 
0.012 
(1.590) 
Demographic Control 
Variables 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 7,966 8,605 7966 8605 8605 
R-square (overall) 0.09 0.15 0.12 0.06 0.09 
 
Notes: We use *,**,*** in a two tailed test to respectively indicate statistical significance at 10 percent, 5 percent and 1 
percent levels; In Table 9, we show the results of both aggregated and individual measures of real earnings management, 
Cohen and Zarowin (2010). We estimate Model 1, 2, 3, 4 and 5 using fixed effects regression; we show co-efficient 
estimates above and t-statistics below in brackets. REALMGMT1 = calculated as the aggregate of abnormal discretionary 
expenditures (ABNOR_DEXP) and abnormal production costs (ABNOR_PCOST); Cohen and Zarowin (2010). 
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REALMGMT2 = calculated as the aggregate of abnormal discretionary expenditure (ABNOR_DEXP) and abnormal cash 
flows (ABNOR_CASH). The higher the value for REALMGMT1 and REALMGMT2, the higher the level of real earnings 
management; Cohen and Zarowin (2010).  ABNOR_DEXP = estimated by regressing discretionary expenses on the inverse 
of lagged total assets and lagged sales scaled by lagged total assets. The figure for (ABNOR_DEXP) is multiplied by 
negative one (-1), consequently, a higher (ABNOR_DEXP) figure represents higher real earnings management; 
ABNOR_PCOST = estimated by regressing PCOST on the inverse of lagged total assets, sales scaled by lagged total assets, 
change in sales scaled by lagged total assets. The figure for (ABNOR_PCOST) is multiplied by negative one (-1), 
consequently, a higher (ABNOR_PCOST) figure represents higher real earnings management. ABNOR_CASH = estimated 
by regressing CASFO scaled by lagged total assets on the inverse of lagged total assets, sales scaled by lagged total assets, 
change in sales scaled by lagged total assets. The figure for (ABNOR_ CASH) is multiplied by negative one (-1), 
consequently, a higher (ABNOR_ CASH) figure represents higher real earnings management, Cohen and Zarowin (2010). 
Other variables are defined above and in the Appendix A. 
 
The individual results of the association between religious social norms and abnormal 
production costs, abnormal discretionary expenses and abnormal cash flows are presented in 
columns 4 to 6 in Table 9. Similarly, columns 2 and 3 in table 9 show the aggregated results 
for the measures of real-activities earnings management previously reported in tables 4. 
Interestingly, we find evidence of a significant (P ≤ 0.001) positive association between 
religiosity and the three individual measures of real activities. The results are consistent with 
the aggregated measures of real-activities (REALMGMT1 and REALMGMT2), suggesting 
that because real-activities earnings management is not subject to scrutiny of auditors and 
does not violate GAAP, religious managers deem it appropriate to cut down advertising, R & 
D expenses, delay payment of goods, reduce selling prices, give more discounts etc. to 
manage reported earnings upwards or downwards.   
6.3 Alternative Measures of Discretionary Accruals  
Again, we conduct further robustness test to estimate discretionary abnormal accruals using 
working capital accruals defined in equation (2). Following prior research (Behn, Gotti, 
Herrmann, and Kang, 2013; Dechow et al, 2012; Haw, Ho, and Li, 2011; Xie et al. 2003), we 
compute discretionary accruals using the modified-Jones model with working capital accruals 
for each firm year observation and two digit SIC code and industry. The results are presented 
in Table 10 below. The results support the earlier findings that the association between 
religiosity and abnormal accruals is still negative and significant (p < 0.01) when 
discretionary accruals are computed using working capital accruals in the modified-Jones 
model. In additional untabulated analyses, we augment both Jones-model and modified-Jones 
model to include lagged return on assets (ROA). Prior studies (Dechow et al., 2012; Kothari 
et al, 2005) observe that inclusion of past ROA attenuates misspecification but does not 
eliminate it. Interestingly, in both Jones-model and modified-Jones model with lagged ROA, 
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we find that the relationship between abnormal accruals and religiosity is significantly 
negative (p < 0.01). 
 
TABLE 10:  Religiosity and Accrual Based Earnings Management 
VARIABLE Modified-Jones Model 
(Total Accruals) 
Modified-Jones Model 
(Working Capital Accruals) 
Constant    0.724***     0.651*** 
REL 
    - 0.059*** 
(-3.406) 
    -0.051*** 
(-3.190) 
SIZE 
    -0.067*** 
(-9.600) 
  - 0.054*** 
(-6.460) 
ANALYST_FOL 
-0.004* 
(-1.648) 
-0.043 
(0.150) 
ROA 
   -0.171*** 
(-3.263) 
   -0.028*** 
(4.460) 
LEV 
      0.092*** 
(4.530) 
     0.023*** 
(-9.610) 
BIG4 
  -0.011** 
(-2.090) 
-0.009 
(-0.770) 
MBV 
     0.013*** 
(6.080) 
    0.023*** 
(9.020) 
LOSS 
0.005 
(1.140) 
0.009* 
(1.670) 
OPERA_RISK 
     0.014*** 
(6.490) 
     0.015*** 
(5.940) 
BENCHMARK 
0.005 
(1.530) 
-0.007 
(-0.110) 
TENURE 
-0.034 
(-0.630) 
-0.001 
(-0.380) 
CHANGE_GDP 
-0.002 
(-0.560) 
-0.002 
(-1.610) 
INVESTMENT 
-0.008 
(-0.040) 
-0.006 
(-0.380) 
NOA 
   -0.378*** 
(-9.830) 
    0.038*** 
(5.190) 
Demographic Control Variables Yes Yes 
Industry Fixed Effects Yes Yes 
Observations 8,605 8,605 
R-square (overall) 0.34 0.36 
 
Notes: We use *,**,*** in a two tailed test to respectively indicate statistical significance at 10 percent, 5 percent and 1 
percent levels; we estimate both models 1 and 2  using fixed effects regression. To compute abnormal discretional accruals, 
we revise the modified Jones model and replace total accruals (TAC) by working capital accruals (WC_ACRUALS) defined 
as earnings before extraordinary items plus depreciation and amortisation minus cash flows from operating activities 
(Dechow et al., 2012; Peasnell et al., 1999). We show co-efficient estimates above and t-statistics below in brackets; All 
other variables are defined above and in the Appendix A. 
 
6.4 Alternative Measure of Religiosity 
Although our measure of religious social norm is supported by prior studies (McGuire et al. 
2012; Callen et al 2011; Grullon et al. 2010), we conduct further robustness tests to ensure 
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that our results are free from potential bias and do not rely on generalisation of religious 
datasets across several years. We use different source of religious datasets collected by 
Gallup survey for the study period
17
. We run our regressions for only the twenty U.S. States 
with available Gallup religious datasets. Interestingly, we find that the results presented in 
Table 11 are consistent with our initial results. Our inferences still remain the same when 
religiosity was measured by a simple aggregate of the responses to the three Gallup questions 
on religion. Specifically, abnormal accruals is negatively and significantly (p < 0.05) related 
to religiosity, both measures of real activities are positively and significantly (p < 0.01) 
associated with religiosity and classification shifting is positively and significantly (p < 0.01) 
associated with religiosity.  
TABLE 11: Religiosity and Earnings Management in Twenty US States 
VARIABLE ABNOR_ACC RAELMGMT1 REALMGMT2 ABNOR_CORE 
CONSTANT 0.368** 0.157** 0.131** 0.160** 
REL 
   -0.024** 
(-2.170) 
     0.180*** 
(2.750) 
    0.089*** 
(3.270) 
   0.023** 
(2.890) 
SIZE 
    - 0.007** 
(-2.060) 
   - 0.050*** 
(-4.150) 
  - 0.033*** 
(-8.780) 
   0.037** 
(1.920) 
ANALYST_FOL 
-0.004 
(-1.370) 
    -0.033** 
(-2.440) 
  -0.033** 
(-2.340) 
0.007 
(1.510) 
ROA 
      - 0.085*** 
(-5.320) 
    -0.275*** 
(-3.510) 
   -0.105*** 
(-3.380) 
    -0.082*** 
(-4.470) 
LEV 
     0.015** 
(2.170) 
0.059 
(2.580) 
0.020 
(0.120) 
     0.052*** 
(3.180) 
BIG4 
-0.020 
(-1.460) 
-0.082* 
(-1.730) 
  0.051** 
(2.180) 
0.053 
(0.590) 
MBV 
 0.003 
(1.150) 
      0.025*** 
(2.330) 
    0.014** 
(2.240) 
     0.051*** 
(3.430) 
LOSS 
   0.004** 
(2.170) 
0.024* 
(1.730) 
     0.072*** 
(3.250) 
     0.042*** 
(5.120) 
OPERA_RISK 
   0.010** 
(2.380) 
0.003 
(1.100) 
  0.002 
 (1.420) 
 0.005* 
(1.780) 
BENCHMARK 
0.007 
(0.540) 
 0.028 
(1.020) 
 -0.036* 
 (-1.790) 
-0.120* 
(-1.700) 
TENURE 
-0.001 
(-0.360) 
-0.002 
(-0.060) 
-0.007 
(-0.520) 
-0.002 
(-0.540) 
CHANGE_GDP 
  0.017** 
(2.040) 
-0.013* 
(-1.760) 
  0.017** 
(1.990) 
-0.003 
(-0.910) 
INVESTMENT 
  -0.092* 
(-1.770) 
    -0.394*** 
(-3.620) 
-0.169* 
(-1.670) 
    0.112*** 
 (5.600) 
NOA 
     0.012*** 
(3.970) 
  0.055* 
(1.880) 
             0.023 
            (0.760) 
     0.031*** 
(4.160) 
Demographic Cont. 
Variables 
Yes Yes Yes Yes 
                                                          
17 Thereafter, we take a sub-sample of our original data based on the twenty most and least religious states in the U.S. as reported by Gallup 
survey. We surrogate our original religious datasets by Gallup religious datasets for the twenty U.S. States and merge them into the 
compustat financial data file using the state code identifiers. 
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Industry Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 4445 3831 3831 4445 
Adj. R-square (overall) 0.24 0.13 0.20 0.26 
 
Notes: We use *, **, *** in a two tailed test to respectively indicate statistical significance at 10 percent, 5 percent and 1 
percent levels. We estimate models 1, 2, 3 and 4 using fixed effects regression. Table 11 reports the association between 
religiosity and earnings management using a subsample of firms in the most and least religious U.S. states based on Gallup 
survey. T-statistics for all models are reported in parentheses below coefficient estimates. All other variables are defined 
above and in the Appendix A. 
 
Overall, the results demonstrate that religious social norms minimises accruals-based 
earnings management but managers in highly religious environment have preference for real-
activities and classification shifting earnings management because there is no GAAP 
violation, there is lack of external and internal monitoring and that both methods are deemed 
acceptable and appropriate. 
 
7. CONCLUSION 
Previous studies (Zalata and Roberts, 2015; Kim and Park, 2014; Donelson et al., 2013) on 
earnings management have shown that managers use different methods to manage reported 
income. Several studies also report that a firm’s corporate governance mechanism mitigates 
earnings management practices. We build on prior studies (McGuire et al 2012; Dyreng et al. 
2010) to establish the association between religiosity and classification shifting earnings 
management and the moderating effect of corporate governance variables and religiosity.  
We contribute to the earnings management literature and report that religiosity is positively 
associated with classification shifting earnings management. We provide evidence that 
religious social norms of the firm’s environment complement corporate governance 
mechanisms to curb accruals earnings management but real activities and classification 
shifting is pervasive and significant in an environment where religious social norms influence 
managerial behaviour and decisions. Furthermore, our findings show the importance of 
religious social norms in shaping shareholders value, therefore, the results are useful for 
regulators, external monitors, investors and shareholders to help create value for 
shareholders.   
The article has several policy and practical implications. Firstly, the findings are consistent 
with social norm theory as social norms are reported to shape the behaviour and attitudes of 
managers in corporate decision making. This is important because religion is scarcely 
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mentioned or discussed in secular organisations but an understanding of the role of religion in 
improving corporate financial reporting will shape policy decisions to create value for 
shareholders.  Again, our findings have important implications for policy makers and 
regulators as they contribute to the debate on the choice between earnings management 
practices and corporate governance mechanism in an environment where religious social 
norms are predominant. The study also has implications for understanding factors that affect 
earnings management and the associated interaction between religiosity and corporate 
governance. The study highlights the need to monitor management behaviour and institute 
independent regulators to improve investor protection. 
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APPENDICES 
Appendix A: The following table shows the measurement of variables in the study: 
Variables Proxy Definition 
 
Religiosity  
REL 
Strength of religiosity for each U.S. county measured by 
Association of Statisticians of American Religious Bodies 
(ASARB) surveys. The results of these surveys are published 
on the website of Association of Religion Data Archive 
(ARDA). The average of each county religiosity score is 
weighted by the county’s population. 
Abnormal 
Accruals  
ABNOR_ACCRUAL
S 
Measure of abnormal accruals or residuals using the 
Modified-Jones model in equation 1. (McGuire et al. 2012; 
Defond and Jiambalvo, 1994; Dechow et al. 1995) See below. 
Discretionary 
Expenses 
D_EXP Measured as the aggregate of advertising expenses, R& D 
expenses, SG & A expenses scaled by lagged total assets 
Abnormal 
Discretionary 
Expenses 
ABNOR_DEXP Estimated after regressing discretionary expenses on the 
inverse of lagged total assets and lagged sales scaled by 
lagged total assets. The figure for (ABNOR_DEXP) is 
multiplied by negative one (-1), consequently, a higher 
(ABNOR_DEXP) figure represents higher real earnings 
management.  
Cash flow from 
operation 
CASFO Is the cash flow from operational activities scaled lagged total 
assets 
Abnormal Cash 
flow 
ABNOR_CASH Estimated by regressing CASFO scaled by lagged total assets 
on the inverse of lagged total assets, sales scaled by lagged 
total assets, change in sales scaled by lagged total assets. The 
figure for (ABNOR_ CASH) is multiplied by negative one (-
1), consequently, a higher (ABNOR_ CASH) figure represents 
higher real earnings management. 
Production 
Costs 
PCOST Measured as the aggregate of cost of sales and change in 
inventory during the year scaled by lagged total assets.  
Abnormal 
Production 
Costs 
ABNOR_PCOST Residuals estimated by regressing PCOST on the inverse of 
lagged total assets, sales scaled by lagged total assets, change 
in sales scaled by lagged total assets. The figure for 
(ABNOR_PCOST) is multiplied by negative one (-1), 
consequently, a higher (ABNOR_PCOST) figure represents 
higher real earnings management.  
Real Earnings 
Activities 1 
REALMGMT1 Calculated as the aggregate of abnormal discretionary 
expenditures (ABNOR_DEXP) and abnormal production costs 
(ABNOR_PCOST). The higher the value, the higher the levels 
of real earnings management 
Real Earnings 
Activities 2 
REALMGMT2 Calculated as the aggregate of abnormal discretionary 
expenditure (ABNOR_DEXP) and abnormal cash flows 
(ABNOR_CASH). The higher the value, the higher the level 
of real earnings management 
Total Assets TA Measured as total Non-current assets plus total current assets 
Size of the Firm SIZE The natural log of total assets/Consumer Price Index 
Analyst 
Following 
ANALYST_FOL Number of financial analysts following the firm in the 
I/B/E/S summary file 
Return on 
Assets 
ROA Measured as net income before extraordinary items divided 
by average total assets 
Leverage LEV Financial leverage, measured as total debts scaled by total 
equity 
 
Presence of Big BIG4 A value of 1 if the firm was audited by big 4, otherwise zero. 
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4 Auditors  
Market to Book 
Value 
MBV 
Measured as total assets divided by market capitalization 
Reported Loss  LOSS An indicator variable that equals 1 if income before 
extraordinary items was negative in the current or previous 
two fiscal years, and 0 otherwise; 
Operational 
Risk 
OPERA_RISK Estimated as five year rolling standard deviation of operating 
cash flows estimated from both current and previous four 
years 
Firm’s located 
in rural areas 
RURAL Indicator variable that equals 1 if the firm is headquartered 
outside the 490 largest counties in the sample, and 0 
otherwise 
Benchmark BENCHMARK The indicator value is 1 if (a) net income scaled by total 
assets is more than or equal to 0 and less than 0.01. 
Alternatively, if the change in net income scaled by total 
assets from previous year to current year is greater than or 
equal to 0 and less than 0.01, and 0 otherwise; 
Auditor Tenure TENURE Natural log of the number of years the auditor has been with 
the firm 
Change in GDP CHANGE_GDP Annual percentage change in GDP 
Firm Level of 
Investment 
INVESTMENT Percentage of capital expenditure at the beginning of the year 
(t) to total net property, plant and equipment at the end of the 
year (t) 
Net Operating 
Assets 
NOA Defined as the sum of shareholders’ equity less cash and 
marketable securities plus total debt at the beginning of the 
year, scaled by total assets at the beginning of the year 
Population  POPN Natural log of the estimate of the population for each US 
State in millions. 
Income  INCOME Household income for each US State in ten thousands ($) 
estimated by Census Bureau. 
Education  EDU A measure of adult population in each US State with college 
education, estimated by Gallup interviews.   
Age of 
respondents  
AGE Average age of residents in each US State, based on the 
responses from Gallup interviews. 
Minority MINORITY Percentage of racial minorities in each US State, from 
responses to the Gallup interviews. 
Political POLITICAL Percentage of the adult population in each US State who is 
affiliated with the Republican party, from Gallup interview 
response.  
CEO-Tenure CEO_TEN Measured as the number of years a CEO has held the position 
as CEO in the organisation 
Audit 
Committee 
Presence  
AUCOM 
A dummy variable coded as 1 if the company has an audit 
committee, otherwise zero. 
Independent 
Board  
BODIND Calculated as the number of independent directors divided by 
the total number of directors on the board. Defined as non-
executive directors holding less than 5% of the voting 
securities and having no direct or indirect interest or 
relationship that could reasonably influence their objective 
judgment and decision making 
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Board Size  BODSIZE Total number of directors on the board 
Religiosity 
interacts Board 
size 
 RELBODSIZE Religiosity multiplied by Board Size 
Religiosity 
interacts Board 
independence 
RELBODIND Religiosity multiplied by Board independence 
Religiosity 
interacts Audit 
Committee 
RELAUCOM Religiosity multiplied by Audit committee 
Religiosity 
interacts CEO 
tenure 
RELCEOTEN Religiosity multiplied by CEO turnover 
Normal Core 
Earnings 
NOR_CE This is the core earnings that is actually expected to occur in 
the normal course of business activity devoid of classification 
shifting.  The study follows McVay (2006) expectation model 
in equation 6. 
 
Reported Core 
Earnings     REP_CE
 
Estimated as sales – cost of goods sold – selling, general and 
administration expenses. Depreciation and Amortization are 
excluded from Cost of Sales, Selling, General and 
Administrative Expenses. 
Unexpected 
Core Earnings    UNEXP_CE 
Is the difference between reported and normal or expected 
core earnings (McVay, 2006). 
Asset Turnover 
ATO
 
Sales scaled by average net operating assets. Where net 
operating assets is the difference between operating assets 
and operating liabilities. Operating assets = Total assets – 
Cash and Cash equivalent. Operating Liabilities = Total 
assets – Total debt - Book value of common equity – 
Preferred equity – Minority interests.
 Total Accruals  
TAC 
Difference between earnings before extraordinary items and 
discontinued operations and the cash flow from operational 
activities scaled by lagged total assets 
Operating 
Accrual 
ACCRUALS
 
Operating Accrual = (Net income before extraordinary items 
– cash flow from operation)/Sales.
 Working 
Capital 
Accruals 
WC_ACCRUALS 
Measured as earnings before extraordinary items plus 
depreciation and amortisation minus cash flow from 
operational activities. 
Percent change 
in sales 
∆Sales
 
(Salest – Salest-1)/ Salest
 % change in 
Sales 
NEG_∆Sales
 
where ∆SALES is less than 0, otherwise zero
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Appendix B:  Sample Selection Procedures and Derivation 
Description (Sample Period: 2004-2013) 
Initial Sample: Firm year observations with financial data 78,026 
Exclude: Financial services Companies (SIC Codes 60-69) (20,251) 
Exclude: Firms with missing financial information  (10,883) 
Exclude: Observations with less than 8 firms in each SIC/year 
combination 
(29,117) 
Exclude: Firms with revenue less than $500,000 (6,014) 
Final usable sample  11,105 
 
Number of unique firms               =        1,616 firms 
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Appendix C: Classification by Year and Industry 
SIC Industry 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 Total 
10 Metal Mining  8 11 13 13 13 15 17 15 14 8 127 
13 Oil & Gas 66 68 71 72 70 68 70 67 71 8 631 
20 Food And Kindred 
Products 23 25 29 33 35 36 39 42 45 46 
353 
22 Textile & Printing 
Products  31 33 37 41 43 44 47 51 54 56 
437 
27 Printing And Publishing 18 21 19 19 19 17 15 14 14 9 165 
28 Chemicals & Allied 
Products 103 145 148 137 136 128 126 124 112 14 
1,173 
34 Primary Metal Products 80 96 93 84 81 79 77 75 76 10 751 
35 Industrial Machinery & 
Eqmt. 
85 113 102 103 100 97 97 98 95 19 909 
36 Electronic Equipment 119 180 179 179 168 160 157 146 139 28 1,455 
37 Transportation Equipment 29 40 43 46 46 45 45 44 45 10 393 
38 Instruments & Related 
Prod. 
135 195 196 183 173 160 153 145 132 37 1,509 
48 Communications 39 36 39 35 32 31 29 27 25 10 303 
49 Elect, Gas & Sanitary 
Serv. 
11 21 21 21 19 20 19 15 15 11 173 
50 Wholesale Trade - 
Durables 
123 164 151 141 135 134 131 125 120 18 1,242 
73 Business Services 96 130 134 116 104 98 92 83 87 13 953 
79 Amusement & Recreation 8 12 12 10 10 10 10 12 12 11 107 
80 Health Services 17 23 25 24 24 24 24 20 16 14 211 
87 Eng. & Mgmt. Services 24 29 30 26 23 20 19 15 15 12 213 
 Total 1015 1342 1342 1283 1231 1186 1167 1118 1087 334 11,105 
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